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There	  is	  general	  agreement	  that	  the	  General	  Agreement	  on	  Tariffs	  and	  
Trade/World	  Trade	  Organization	  has	  increased	  the	  volume	  and	  the	  ease	  of	  flow	  of	  
international	  trade	  and,	  by	  way	  of	  comparison,	  sparked	  considerable	  debate	  regarding	  the	  
effects	  of	  membership	  in	  the	  GATT/WTO	  on	  women’s	  rights.	  Normatively,	  this	  is	  an	  
important	  question.	  How	  does	  the	  increasing	  and	  pervasive	  reality	  of	  openness	  and	  
increasing	  trade	  affect	  the	  lives	  and	  opportunities	  of	  women?	  Using	  three	  original	  
theories	  and	  the	  results	  of	  four	  fixed-­‐effects	  models,	  I	  find	  that	  membership	  in	  this	  
institution	  has	  no	  significant	  effect	  on	  women’s	  rights.	  My	  conclusion	  is	  that	  membership	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CHAPTER	  I	  
	  INTRODUCTION	  
	   The	  General	  Agreements	  on	  Tariffs	  and	  Trade	  and	  its	  successor	  the	  World	  Trade	  
Organization	  have	  without	  a	  doubt	  affected	  the	  shape	  and	  volume	  of	  world	  trade.	  The	  
scholarly	  consensus	  with	  regard	  to	  trade	  outcomes	  for	  states	  is	  divided.	  On	  the	  
aggregate,	  these	  international	  institutions	  and	  related	  international	  trade	  agreements	  
have	  increased	  the	  amount	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  that	  flow	  freely	  (or	  with	  minimal	  
barriers)	  in	  the	  international	  economy.1	  In	  some	  cases,	  there	  are	  specific	  conditions	  that	  
dictate	  which	  states	  or	  when	  benefit.2	  	  Finally,	  there	  are	  (a	  minority	  of)	  scholars	  that	  
argue	  against	  the	  trade	  liberalization	  and	  trade	  promotion	  effects	  of	  the	  GATT/WTO.3	  
Being	  a	  member	  of	  the	  GATT/WTO	  results	  in	  varied	  effects	  and	  consequences	  for	  
member	  states.	  Its	  main	  purpose	  (to	  lower	  tariffs	  and	  to	  open	  and	  keep	  open	  markets)4	  
and	  the	  outcomes	  of	  attempting	  to	  accomplish	  the	  goals	  set	  forth	  in	  its	  mission	  
statement	  have	  overall	  led	  to	  increasing	  world	  trade	  and	  lowering	  barriers	  to	  trade,	  with	  
some	  exceptions.	  The	  varied	  effects	  of	  membership	  are	  a	  result	  of	  being	  a	  member	  of	  
an	  international	  institution	  and	  from	  specifically	  being	  a	  member	  of	  an	  international	  
trade	  institution.	  These	  effects	  and	  consequences	  (of	  membership)	  can	  broadly	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  For	  a	  useful	  summary	  of	  the	  general	  scholarly	  consensus	  on	  how	  international	  trade	  agreements	  have	  increase	  and	  liberalized	  
international	  trade,	  see	  (Baier	  2007;	  Chang	  2011;	  Goldstein,	  Rivers,	  and	  Tomz	  2007;	  Baldwin	  2012,	  29)	  
	  
2	  For	  a	  summary	  of	  arguments	  regarding	  the	  trade	  promotion	  and	  liberalization	  effects	  of	  the	  GATT/WTO	  being	  under	  to	  certain	  
conditions	  or	  for	  certain	  groups	  of	  states	  in	  the	  international	  system,	  see	  (Subramanian	  2007;	  Gowa	  and	  Kim	  2006;	  Krugman	  1987;	  
Gowa	  2009;	  Kim	  2010,	  Ch.4)	  
	  
3	  For	  a	  summary	  of	  arguments	  against	  the	  trade	  liberalization	  and/or	  promotion	  effects	  of	  the	  GATT/WTO,	  see	  (Rose	  2004;	  Rose	  
2002)	  
	  
4	  See	  WTO	  mission	  statement	  (www.wto.org)	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categorized	  as	  social,	  economic,	  and	  political,	  and	  differentially	  affect	  the	  people	  living	  
and	  working	  in	  member	  states.5,6,7	  
	   There	  are	  differential	  effects	  on	  member	  states	  from	  the	  expansion	  of	  
international	  trade	  due	  to	  membership	  in	  the	  GATT/WTO	  and	  so	  too	  are	  there	  
differential	  effects	  on	  the	  citizens	  in	  these	  states.	  Nowhere	  is	  the	  debate	  (over	  the	  
effects	  of	  increased	  openness)	  more	  contentious	  than	  that	  which	  examines	  the	  
relationship	  between	  membership	  in	  the	  GATT/WTO	  and	  the	  effects	  on	  women’s	  rights.	  
Insofar	  as	  there	  is	  general	  (though	  certainly	  not	  total)	  scholarly	  consensus	  that	  
membership	  in	  the	  GATT/WTO	  has	  the	  effect	  of	  increasing	  the	  volume	  of	  trade	  in	  a	  state	  
as	  well	  as	  forcing	  that	  state	  to	  decrease	  its	  barriers	  to	  international	  trade,	  there	  is	  
nothing	  close	  to	  a	  clear	  or	  helpful	  consensus	  regarding	  its	  effects	  (WTO	  membership)	  on	  
women’s	  rights.	  
There	  is	  general	  agreement	  that	  the	  GATT/WTO	  has	  increased	  the	  volume	  and	  
the	  ease	  of	  flow	  of	  international	  trade,	  and	  by	  way	  of	  comparison,	  considerable	  debate	  
regarding	  the	  effects	  of	  membership	  in	  the	  GATT/WTO	  on	  women’s	  rights.	  Normatively,	  
this	  is	  an	  important	  question.	  How	  does	  the	  increasing	  and	  pervasive	  reality	  of	  
increasing	  openness	  and	  increasing	  trade	  affect	  the	  lives	  and	  opportunities	  of	  women?	  
The	  GATT/WTO	  is	  here	  to	  stay.	  Through	  negotiations	  in	  successive	  trade	  rounds,	  trade	  in	  
an	  ever-­‐expanding	  amount	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  is	  becoming	  increasingly	  liberalized	  
and	  regulated.	  Irrespective	  of	  the	  debate	  among	  scholars	  about	  the	  actual	  direction	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  For	  the	  general	  effects	  of	  international	  trade,	  see	  (Keohane	  1996,	  Ch.1;	  Lamy	  2008;	  Ostry	  2008)	  
	  
6	  For	  economic	  effects	  (on	  national	  economies)	  of	  international	  trade,	  see	  (Hiscox	  2001;	  Redding	  1999)	  
	  
7	  For	  (political	  and	  economic)	  effects	  specific	  to	  developing	  countries,	  see	  (Mahler	  2004;	  Milner	  2005;	  Bhagwati	  1994;	  Grynberg	  
2006)	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the	  effect(s)	  of	  international	  trade	  (as	  a	  consequence	  of	  joining	  the	  GATT/WTO),	  
membership	  in	  this	  institution	  matters	  for	  every	  aspect	  of	  a	  woman’s	  life.	  
	  In	  the	  same	  manner	  that	  states	  ask	  themselves	  whether	  they	  have	  and	  continue	  
to	  benefit	  from	  trade	  liberalization,	  so	  too	  is	  it	  important	  to	  ask	  how	  liberalization,	  as	  a	  
result	  of	  membership	  in	  the	  GATT/WTO,	  has	  specifically	  affected	  women.	  Envision	  
women	  as	  a	  country:	  they	  would	  be	  the	  largest	  and	  poorest	  country	  in	  the	  world	  (Wee	  
1998,	  101).	  Their	  “country”	  would	  be	  characterized	  by	  (Wee	  1998,	  101):	  
• A	  low	  growth	  economy	  
• Low	  access	  to	  credit	  
• Dependence	   on	   commodities,	   agriculture,	   and	   labor-­‐intensive	  
manufacturing	  industries	  as	  its	  main	  exports	  
• A	  high	  degree	  of	  non-­‐monetized	  productivity	  
• Low	  physical	  quality	  of	  life	  for	  the	  labor	  force	  
• A	  low-­‐skilled	  population	  
• Low	  levels	  of	  technological	  infrastructure	  
• Poor	  social	  infrastructure	  
• Low	   level	   of	   land	   ownership,	  with	   local	   land	   accounting	   for	   only	   1%	   of	  
land	  ownership	  and	  the	  rest	  owned	  by	  foreign	  interests	  
	  
This	  fits	  or	  matches	  the	  profile	  of	  a	  least	  developed	  country,	  or	  LDC	  (Wee	  1998,	  101).	  
The	  last	  twenty-­‐plus	  years	  of	  trade	  liberalization	  has	  created	  jobs	  for	  millions	  of	  women	  
workers	  and	  for	  many	  individual	  women,	  their	  jobs	  have	  brought	  greater	  economic	  
independence,	  equality	  in	  the	  household,	  and	  personal	  empowerment	  (Coryndon	  2004,	  
17).	  However,	  millions	  of	  women	  are	  employed	  precariously.	  Their	  terms	  of	  
employment	  are	  characterized	  by	  short-­‐term	  contracts	  with	  limited	  access	  to	  social	  
protections,	  long	  working	  hours	  in	  high	  pressure	  situations	  in	  unhealthy	  or	  dangerous	  
conditions,	  and	  being	  undermined	  at	  every	  turn	  in	  their	  attempts	  to	  organize	  and	  
demand	  for	  their	  basic	  labor	  and	  social	  rights	  to	  be	  met	  (Coryndon	  2004,	  17).	  In	  an	  ideal	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world,	  an	  expanding	  export	  sector	  (as	  a	  result	  of	  membership	  in	  the	  GATT/WTO)	  should	  
be	  an	  opportunity	  for	  employment	  to	  be	  both	  more	  secure	  and	  to	  bring	  about	  more	  
rights	  for	  women;	  instead,	  the	  sourcing	  and	  purchasing	  practices	  of	  many	  companies	  
creates	  pressures	  that	  results	  in	  precarious	  and	  dangerous	  conditions	  for	  women	  
(Coryndon	  2004,	  17).	  This	  is	  not	  unique	  to	  developing	  countries;	  the	  impact	  falls	  on	  
women	  in	  poor	  communities	  in	  rich	  countries	  as	  well	  (Coryndon	  2004,	  17).	  
	   In	  developing	  countries	  specifically,	  the	  orientation	  to	  openness	  to	  trade	  and	  
exports	  has	  been	  the	  most	  important	  factor	  in	  determining	  which	  jobs	  are	  created	  for	  
women;	  no	  factor	  has	  had	  more	  significance	  than	  trade	  (Wee	  1998,	  30).	  Women	  have	  
been	  crucial	  in	  raising	  the	  export	  competitiveness	  of	  these	  states.	  There	  exist	  no	  cases	  
of	  states	  that	  have	  succeeded	  in	  becoming	  export	  competitive	  in	  their	  respective	  
manufacturing	  sectors	  without	  increasing	  the	  participation	  of	  women	  in	  the	  modern	  or	  
monetized	  sector	  of	  their	  economies	  (Wee	  1998,	  30).	  Women	  have	  been	  the	  “workforce	  
of	  choice”	  in	  these	  newly	  and	  rapidly	  expanding	  export	  industries	  (Wee	  1998,	  30).	  	  
For	  example,	  in	  Bangladesh,	  the	  export-­‐oriented	  garment	  sector	  began	  in	  the	  
1970s	  and	  expanded	  rapidly	  (Beneria	  2003,	  179).	  Women	  now	  comprise	  85%	  of	  all	  
employees	  involved	  in	  production	  industries	  (Coryndon	  2004,	  17).	  There	  has	  been	  
“significant	  personal	  change”	  for	  many	  women,	  including	  but	  not	  limited	  to	  paid	  
employment,	  a	  first	  for	  many	  women,	  has	  improved	  their	  bargaining	  power	  within	  the	  
family	  (Coryndon	  2004,	  18).	  A	  survey	  of	  women	  in	  more	  than	  30	  garment	  factories	  in	  
Bangladesh	  found	  that	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  these	  women	  had	  some	  control	  over	  their	  earnings	  
(Coryndon	  2004,	  18).	  Married	  women,	  interviewed	  in	  2003,	  said	  they	  now	  make	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decisions	  alongside	  their	  husbands	  with	  regard	  to	  family	  matters,	  and	  a	  small	  but	  
significant	  minority	  said	  their	  husbands	  now	  share	  some	  of	  the	  housework,	  including	  
cooking	  and	  shopping	  (Coryndon	  2004,	  18).	  As	  one	  Bangladeshi	  woman	  put	  it,	  “in	  my	  
mother’s	  time…women	  had	  to	  tolerate	  more	  suffering…they	  are	  better	  off	  now,	  they	  
know	  about	  the	  world,	  they	  have	  been	  given	  education,	  they	  can	  work	  and	  stand	  on	  
their	  own	  feet…they	  have	  more	  freedom”	  (Coryndon	  2004,	  18).	  The	  government	  in	  
Bangladesh,	  under	  pressure	  to	  reform	  in	  order	  to	  retain	  US	  trade	  preferences,	  and	  
aiming	  to	  build	  a	  better	  reputation	  for	  labor	  standards,	  committed	  itself	  to	  lifting	  its	  ban	  
on	  trade	  union	  activities	  by	  January	  of	  2004	  (Coryndon	  2004,	  62).	  However,	  there	  is	  a	  
constant	  backlog	  of	  workers’	  cases	  waiting	  for	  a	  hearing	  at	  labor	  courts;	  each	  case	  can	  
take	  up	  to	  five	  years	  to	  settle	  (Coryndon	  2004,	  63).	  The	  government,	  under	  advice	  from	  
the	  World	  Bank,	  has	  avoided	  introducing	  regulations	  that	  increase	  the	  cost	  of	  employing	  
women	  (and	  discourage	  their	  employment),	  such	  as	  maternity	  leave	  policies	  and	  
regulations	  about	  women	  working	  at	  night	  (Coryndon	  2004,	  43).	  As	  a	  result,	  since	  
Bangladesh’s	  turn	  to	  export	  orientation	  through	  its	  promotion	  of	  its	  manufacturing	  
industry,	  women	  have	  had	  good	  access	  to	  formal	  sector	  jobs	  in	  the	  garment	  industry,	  
where	  regulations	  have	  been	  minimal	  (Coryndon	  2004,	  43).	  
The	  purpose	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  explain	  the	  dueling	  logics	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  
membership	  in	  the	  GATT/WTO	  on	  women’s	  rights.	  I	  have	  created	  three	  theories	  that	  
help	  us	  understand	  to	  this	  relationship.	  Each	  of	  the	  theories	  can	  be	  interpreted	  or	  used	  
to	  predict	  an	  ultimately	  positive	  set	  of	  outcomes	  with	  regard	  to	  women’s	  rights	  or	  an	  
overall	  negative	  set	  of	  outcomes.	  Using	  the	  result	  of	  four	  fixed-­‐effects	  models,	  I	  will	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determine	  what	  the	  data	  says	  the	  effects	  are,	  positive	  or	  negative,	  of	  membership	  in	  the	  
WTO	  on	  women’s	  rights.	  There	  are	  causal	  logics	  or	  mechanisms	  underlying	  each	  theory	  
that	  predict	  positive	  effects	  as	  well	  as	  those	  that	  predict	  negative	  ones;	  the	  results	  of	  
the	  data	  analysis,	  in	  combination	  with	  theoretical	  expectations,	  tell	  a	  full	  story	  about	  the	  
relationship	  in	  question.	  
The	  three	  theories	  I	  have	  created	  to	  explain	  the	  dueling	  logics	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  
membership	  in	  the	  GATT/WTO	  on	  women’s	  are:	  the	  Welfare	  State	  Theory,	  the	  
International	  Interactions	  Theory,	  and	  the	  Trade	  Flows	  Theory.	  The	  welfare	  state	  theory	  
examines	  the	  effect	  of	  membership	  in	  the	  GATT/WTO	  on	  women’s	  rights	  through	  a	  
story	  about	  how	  increased	  vulnerability	  to	  market	  forces	  (that	  comes	  along	  with	  
increased	  openness	  to	  trade)	  has,	  to	  a	  greater	  or	  lesser	  extent,	  come	  to	  dictate	  the	  
response	  of	  national	  governments.	  The	  response	  of	  national	  governments,	  through	  the	  
provision	  of	  economic	  and	  social	  insurance	  (and	  who	  receives	  these	  benefits	  and	  who	  
does	  not),	  affects	  the	  rights	  and	  opportunities	  of	  women	  in	  every	  state	  in	  the	  global	  
economy.	  The	  international	  interactions	  theory	  explains	  how/whether	  economic	  
interactions	  between	  states	  in	  a	  globalized	  economy	  where	  states	  are	  members	  of	  the	  
GATT/WTO	  (and	  related	  international	  trade	  institutions)	  have	  top-­‐down	  effects	  on	  
changing	  national	  policy	  with	  regard	  to	  women’s	  rights.	  Finally,	  the	  trade	  flows	  theory	  
examines	  how	  increases	  in	  imports	  and	  exports,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  membership	  in	  the	  
GATT/WTO,	  have	  created	  new	  and	  different	  employment	  opportunities	  in	  states	  across	  
the	  international	  economy.	  This	  theory	  predicts	  dueling	  logics	  or	  outcomes	  for	  women:	  
more	  trade	  means	  more	  jobs	  for	  everyone,	  including	  women,	  which	  means	  some	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women	  have	  jobs	  for	  the	  first	  time;	  as	  a	  result,	  they	  have	  increased	  autonomy	  at	  home	  
and	  are	  able	  to	  participate	  more	  actively	  in	  their	  communities.	  However,	  women	  also	  
are	  paid	  much	  less	  than	  men,	  work	  in	  dangerous	  conditions,	  and	  have	  little,	  if	  any,	  
measure	  of	  job	  security.	  
The	  conceptualization	  of	  women’s	  rights	  utilized	  in	  this	  paper	  is	  fairly	  simple	  and	  
mirrors	  the	  empirical	  measure	  used	  in	  the	  data	  section:	  the	  right	  (women	  have)	  to	  legal	  
protection	  and	  equal	  treatment	  under	  the	  law	  in	  a	  state	  and	  that	  are	  actually	  enforced	  
in	  practice.	  Women’s	  (human)	  rights,	  as	  conceptualized	  and	  measured	  in	  this	  paper,	  
refer	  to	  the	  “actions	  of	  government	  officials	  and	  [the]	  actions	  of	  private	  groups	  if	  
instigated	  by	  the	  government	  directly	  affecting	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  citizens	  can	  exercise	  
various	  types	  of	  human	  rights”	  (Cingranelli	  2010,	  411).	  Actions	  refer	  to	  practices;	  
practices	  are	  what	  governments	  actually	  do,	  not	  what	  they	  claim	  they	  do	  or	  what	  
consequences	  come	  from	  what	  they	  do	  (Cingranelli	  2010,	  411).	  This	  is	  arguably	  the	  
closest	  we	  can	  get	  to	  measuring	  the	  actual	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  condition	  of	  women’s	  human	  
rights	  in	  a	  state;	  what	  is	  codified	  into	  law	  versus	  what	  plays	  out	  in	  practice,	  by	  looking	  at	  
the	  actions	  of	  those	  responsible	  for	  enforcing	  the	  laws	  that	  affect	  the	  rights	  of	  women.	  
The	  Cingranelli	  and	  Richards	  Human	  Rights	  Dataset	  uses	  a	  mixed-­‐methods	  
approach	  to	  create	  their	  indicators	  of	  government	  respect	  for	  women’s	  (human)	  rights.	  
They	  utilize	  “content	  analysis	  of	  qualitative	  material	  describing	  respect	  for…rights	  in	  
countries	  around	  the	  world	  to	  create	  quantitative	  indicators”,	  which	  in	  turn	  is	  used	  to	  
create	  their	  coding	  criteria	  (Cingranelli	  2010,	  405).	  This	  criteria	  is	  intended	  to	  reflect	  the	  
meaning	  of	  women’s	  (human)	  rights	  as	  defined	  by	  international	  human	  rights	  laws	  as	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well	  as	  to	  represent	  the	  various	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  expectations	  of	  laws	  and	  actual	  
government	  behavior	  overlap	  (Cingranelli	  2010,	  405).	  The	  CIRI	  women’s	  (human)	  rights	  
scores	  indicators	  are	  considered	  “standards-­‐based”:	  this	  means	  government	  practices	  
with	  regard	  to	  women’s	  rights	  are	  rated	  relative	  to	  standards	  set	  in	  international	  law;	  
states	  are	  not	  ranked	  relative	  to	  one	  another	  (Cingranelli	  2010,	  405-­‐406).	  
This	  paper	  uses	  four	  within	  country,	  fixed	  effects	  models	  to	  analyze	  the	  effect	  of	  
membership	  in	  the	  GATT/WTO	  on	  women’s	  rights.	  The	  models	  test	  the	  effect	  
membership	  in	  the	  GATT/WTO	  on	  four	  groups	  of	  (women’s)	  rights-­‐	  total	  rights,	  political	  
rights,	  economic	  rights,	  and	  social	  rights-­‐	  using	  a	  sample	  of	  214	  states.	  Membership	  only	  
has	  a	  statistically	  significant	  effect	  in	  the	  case	  of	  women’s	  social	  rights;	  these	  include	  
rights	  such	  as	  freedom	  from	  forced	  sterilization,	  traveling	  abroad,	  initiating	  a	  divorce,	  
owning	  property,	  the	  right	  to	  an	  education,	  etc.	  The	  effect	  of	  membership	  on	  women’s	  
total,	  political,	  and	  economic	  rights	  is	  not	  statistically	  significant.	  Putting	  statistical	  
significance	  aside,	  the	  effect	  of	  membership	  on	  women’s	  rights	  is	  very	  small,	  almost	  
indistinguishable	  from	  zero.	  The	  effect	  is	  positive	  in	  the	  case	  of	  women’s	  total	  rights,	  
economic	  rights,	  and	  social	  rights,	  and	  negative	  in	  the	  case	  of	  political	  rights.	  However,	  
in	  three	  of	  the	  four	  models,	  the	  effect	  of	  membership	  is	  not	  statistically	  significant	  and	  
the	  coefficients	  are	  very	  small,	  which	  leads	  to	  preliminary	  conclusion	  that	  the	  effect	  is	  
not	  any	  different	  from	  zero.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  women’s	  social	  rights,	  the	  effect	  is	  
(statistically)	  significant,	  but	  very	  small	  (though	  positive).	  	  
The	  theories	  in	  this	  paper	  predict	  a	  set	  of	  strongly	  positive	  or	  strongly	  negative	  
effects	  for	  women.	  The	  results	  of	  the	  data	  do	  not	  match	  the	  expectations	  of	  the	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theories.	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  the	  most	  likely	  explanation	  is	  that	  positive	  and	  negative	  
effects	  are	  entirely	  and	  impossibly	  inseparable	  in	  real	  world	  practice.	  I	  will	  expand	  
further	  in	  the	  concluding	  section,	  but	  here	  are	  few	  examples:	  though	  women	  have	  more	  
opportunities	  for	  gainful	  employment	  because	  of	  the	  GATT/WTO,	  on	  the	  aggregate	  they	  
are	  paid	  less	  than	  men	  (Fuentes	  1984,	  12),	  and	  in	  many	  third	  world	  countries,	  they	  live	  
on	  wages	  of	  less	  than	  two	  dollars	  a	  day	  (Randriamo	  2006,	  140).	  Membership	  also	  means	  
increased	  economic	  interaction	  among	  countries.	  This	  logically	  and	  necessarily	  leads	  to	  
each	  state	  specializing	  its	  exports	  to	  what	  is	  in	  its	  comparative	  advantage.	  While	  women	  
are	  now	  employed	  in	  nearly	  every	  type	  of	  industry	  across	  the	  board,	  due	  to	  comparative	  
advantage	  and	  the	  international	  division	  of	  labor,	  a	  hidden	  effect	  of	  the	  WTO	  on	  
women’s	  rights	  is	  women	  actually	  competing	  with	  other	  women	  across	  industries	  and	  
across	  states	  for	  jobs,	  benefits,	  and	  other	  important	  rights	  and	  opportunities.	  When	  
demand	  contracts	  and	  imports	  and/or	  exports	  decrease	  in	  a	  state,	  in	  many	  cases	  
women’s	  jobs	  are	  the	  first	  to	  be	  cut;	  they	  are	  seen	  as	  expendable	  and	  their	  income	  is	  
seen	  as	  supplemental	  and	  secondary	  to	  male	  breadwinners.	  	  	  
	   	  




The	  Welfare	  State	  Theory	  	  
The	  Effects	  of	  Increased	  Openness	  	  
	   In	  this	  section	  of	  the	  paper,	  I	  will	  elaborate	  on	  the	  progression	  of	  mechanisms	  or	  
sequential	  causal	  logics	  that,	  under	  the	  specifications	  of	  this	  theory,	  seek	  to	  explain	  how	  
membership	  in	  the	  GATT/WTO	  affects	  women’s	  rights.	  First,	  a	  state	  joins	  the	  
GATT/WTO.	  When	  a	  state	  is	  a	  member	  of	  this	  institution,	  it	  experiences	  a	  relative	  
increase	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  international	  trade	  conducted	  between	  that	  state	  and	  other	  
states	  in	  the	  international	  economy.	  Subsequently,	  the	  state	  is	  also	  now	  more	  
vulnerable	  to	  the	  ups	  and	  downs	  of	  market	  forces.	  Next	  is	  the	  response	  of	  the	  state,	  
using	  welfare	  [state]	  mechanisms.	  Openness	  to	  trade	  and	  increased	  trade	  in	  a	  state	  
causes	  variation	  across	  states	  in	  welfare	  state	  outcomes,	  however	  the	  general	  effects	  of	  
openness	  are	  not	  systematically	  different	  between	  liberal	  and	  non-­‐liberal	  welfare	  
regimes,	  and	  states	  located	  in	  Europe	  and	  those	  located	  elsewhere	  (Brady	  2005).	  Finally,	  
the	  response(s)	  a	  state	  chooses	  affects	  the	  rights	  and	  opportunities	  of	  women.	  
	   A	  broadly	  applicable	  example	  that	  demonstrates	  the	  response	  of	  least	  developed	  
countries	  (LDCs)	  to	  increased	  openness:	  in	  LDCs,	  welfare	  spending	  responds	  to	  greater	  
trade	  flows	  (and	  greater	  capital	  mobility)	  (Rudra	  2002,	  435).	  This	  is	  due	  to	  two	  factors:	  
there	  exist	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  low-­‐skilled	  workers,	  relative	  to	  skilled	  workers,	  and	  a	  
large	  amount	  of	  surplus	  labor	  in	  these	  states	  (Rudra	  2002,	  435).	  The	  combination	  of	  
these	  two	  factors	  serves	  to	  heighten	  the	  collective	  action	  problems	  of	  laborers,	  which	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makes	  it	  difficult	  for	  them	  to	  organize	  to	  demand	  social	  insurance	  from	  their	  
governments	  (Rudra	  2002,	  435).	  In	  addition,	  when	  there	  is	  increased	  pressure	  due	  to	  
more	  openness	  to	  market	  vulnerabilities,	  relative	  to	  labor	  in	  OECD	  countries,	  there	  are	  
not	  institutions	  in	  LDCs	  to	  help	  labor	  defend	  already	  existing	  social	  welfare	  benefits—to	  
overcome	  their	  collective	  action	  problems	  (Rudra	  2002,	  436).	  In	  conclusion,	  in	  this	  case	  
workers’	  potential	  gains	  from	  increased	  openness	  to	  the	  international	  economy	  are	  
outweighed	  (in	  LDCs)	  by	  the	  actuality	  of	  their	  failure	  to	  collectively	  organize	  and	  
pressure	  their	  respective	  governments	  for	  social	  insurance	  (Rudra	  2002,	  436).	  
	   States	  with	  the	  highest	  levels	  of	  exposure	  to	  international	  trade	  increase	  their	  
government	  spending	  (Rodrik	  1998).	  This	  is	  broadly	  applicable	  and	  true	  for	  countries	  
that	  are	  considered	  low	  and	  high	  income.	  Another	  example	  is	  vulnerabilities	  brought	  on	  
by	  a	  financial	  crisis	  (in	  this	  case	  the	  Asian	  Financial	  Crisis)	  that	  force	  policy	  innovation;	  
this	  reflects	  variations	  in	  existing	  welfare	  regimes	  as	  well	  as	  policy	  choices	  made	  once	  
crisis	  is	  inevitable	  and	  governments	  must	  innovate	  to	  mitigate	  the	  increased	  risk	  of	  
economic	  collapse	  faced	  by	  its	  citizens	  (Gough	  2001).	  A	  final	  example	  is	  changes	  in	  
patterns	  of	  demand	  (due	  to	  openness)	  that	  make	  some	  sectors	  less	  competitive.	  
Workers	  often	  possess	  skills	  that	  do	  not	  travel	  between	  sectors,	  and	  because	  social	  
insurance	  is	  (often)	  provided	  by	  one’s	  employer,	  the	  risks	  posed	  by	  entire	  sectors	  
becoming	  uncompetitive	  can	  only	  be	  met	  by	  the	  expansion	  of	  insurance	  provided	  by	  the	  
government	  (Iversen	  2000,	  346).	  Governments	  across	  the	  board	  have	  responded	  by	  
doing	  just	  this:	  expanding	  transfer	  payments	  and	  social	  service	  provisions,	  as	  well	  as	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attempting	  to	  employ	  more	  people	  in	  public	  sector	  service	  jobs,	  to	  mitigate	  gaps	  in	  
productivity	  between	  sectors	  (Iversen	  2000,	  347).	  
Outcomes	  for	  Women	  
	  
	   In	  this	  section,	  I	  will	  discuss	  how	  a	  state’s	  chosen	  policy	  responses	  (because	  of	  
increased	  openness)	  specifically	  affect	  women.	  Under	  the	  specifications	  of	  this	  theory,	  
and	  given	  the	  aforementioned	  examples,	  states	  across	  the	  board	  use	  welfare	  state	  
mechanisms	  or	  policy	  responses	  to	  mitigate	  the	  effects	  of	  increased	  market	  openness.	  
While	  different	  states	  choose	  to	  use	  different	  policies,	  there	  does	  not	  exist	  a	  state	  that	  
does	  not	  use	  some	  type	  of	  welfare	  state	  mechanism(s)	  to	  respond	  to	  increased	  market	  
vulnerabilities.	  The	  policies	  they	  do	  or	  do	  not	  use,	  and	  more	  importantly,	  to	  whom	  these	  
policies	  apply	  or	  do	  not	  apply,	  explain	  effects	  on	  the	  rights	  and	  opportunities	  of	  women.	  
A	  comparison	  of	  three	  different	  types	  of	  welfare	  state	  regimes	  usefully	  illustrates	  
outcomes	  for	  women.	  It	  helps	  us	  to	  understand	  the	  “dynamics	  between	  the	  policy	  logics	  
of	  gender	  regimes	  and	  welfare	  state	  regimes…[and]	  the	  specific	  principles	  of	  
entitlements	  and	  policy	  construction”	  (Sainsbury	  1999,	  245).	  Or,	  how	  welfare	  state	  
policies	  in	  different	  types	  of	  states	  affect	  the	  rights	  and	  opportunities	  of	  women	  
(compared	  to	  men).	  And	  more	  specifically,	  how	  the	  construction	  of	  policy	  and	  the	  
subsequent	  entitlements	  given	  or	  withheld	  affect	  women	  (and	  their	  male	  counterparts).	  
The	  three	  types	  of	  welfare	  regimes	  in	  this	  study	  are	  conservative,	  liberal,	  and	  social	  
democratic.	  	  
	   In	  a	  country	  with	  a	  conservative,	  or	  social-­‐capitalist	  regime,	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  
welfare	  state	  is	  to	  temper	  the	  negative	  effects	  of	  increased	  openness	  while	  still	  allowing	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(as	  much	  as	  possible)	  the	  market	  to	  operate	  without	  interference	  (Sainsbury	  1999,	  254).	  
Social	  insurance	  models	  are	  based	  on	  an	  employee’s	  performance	  at	  their	  place	  of	  work	  
and	  any	  social	  benefits	  a	  citizen	  receives	  correspond	  to	  the	  [economic]	  contributions	  
they	  make	  (Sainsbury	  1999,	  254).	  In	  conservative	  welfare	  states,	  there	  are	  two	  realities	  
with	  regard	  to	  the	  provision	  of	  social	  insurance	  that	  disproportionately	  affect	  outcomes	  
for	  women.	  First,	  care	  and	  domestic	  service	  are	  not	  considered	  work,	  and	  it	  is	  rare	  that	  
social	  insurance	  benefits	  based	  on	  caring	  activities	  are	  anywhere	  as	  comprehensive	  (or	  
exist	  at	  all)	  as	  benefits	  that	  come	  from	  employment.	  Because	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  and	  due	  to	  
the	  fact	  that	  in	  conservative	  welfare	  states	  women	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  out	  of	  the	  
workforce,	  providing	  care	  as	  unpaid	  workers,	  the	  second	  outcome	  for	  women	  is	  that	  
they	  are	  disproportionately	  excluded	  from	  social	  insurance	  coverage,	  which	  is	  the	  main	  
type	  of	  social	  protection	  provided	  by	  this	  type	  of	  state	  (Sainsbury	  1999,	  255).	  
	   In	  liberal	  welfare	  states,	  the	  state	  does	  not	  interfere	  with	  the	  market	  nor	  does	  it	  
involve	  itself	  in	  family	  life;	  only	  in	  cases	  of	  market	  failure	  or	  familial	  breakdown	  does	  the	  
government	  intervene	  (Sainsbury	  1999,	  256).	  Because	  the	  market	  is	  central	  and	  a	  strong	  
work	  ethic	  is	  an	  important	  value,	  liberal	  states	  provide	  occupational	  and	  fiscal	  welfare,	  
which	  excludes	  those	  that	  do	  not	  work	  or	  that	  do	  not	  succeed	  when	  they	  attempt	  to	  
work	  (Sainsbury	  1999,	  256).	  For	  these	  types	  of	  people,	  there	  exists	  a	  guaranteed	  
minimum	  safety	  net	  (Sainsbury	  1999,	  256).	  Occupational	  welfare,	  or	  benefits	  provided	  
by	  one’s	  employer,	  has	  a	  few	  specific	  and	  disadvantageous	  outcomes	  for	  women.	  It	  
mimics	  the	  reward	  structure	  of	  the	  market	  and	  job	  hierarchies	  of	  the	  firm,	  benefits	  are	  
based	  on	  long-­‐term	  service	  to	  a	  company	  and	  reflect	  pay	  differentials,	  and	  low-­‐level	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employees	  are	  often	  excluded	  (Sainsbury	  1999,	  256).	  Because	  labor	  market	  is	  vertically	  
segregated,	  and	  due	  to	  pay	  differentials	  between	  men	  and	  women	  (women	  are	  paid	  less	  
than	  men	  in	  every	  occupation	  around	  the	  world),	  a	  woman’s	  ability	  to	  claim	  
occupational	  benefits	  are	  adversely	  affected	  in	  liberal	  welfare	  regimes	  (Sainsbury	  1999,	  
256).	  Fiscal	  welfare	  benefits,	  or	  benefits	  distributed	  through	  the	  tax	  system,	  also	  have	  
adverse	  effects	  for	  women	  in	  liberal	  welfare	  states.	  First,	  if	  qualifying	  for	  tax	  benefits	  
involves	  an	  income	  ceiling,	  it	  is	  often	  family	  income	  that	  determines	  eligibility	  (and	  thus	  
single	  women	  are	  left	  out)	  (Sainsbury	  1999,	  256).	  Second,	  despite	  the	  growth	  in	  tax	  
benefits	  to	  help	  the	  working	  poor,	  a	  socioeconomic	  class	  that	  in	  many	  states	  is	  
comprised	  heavily	  of	  young(er)	  single	  women,	  fiscal	  welfare	  is	  actually	  more	  
advantageous	  to	  those	  in	  the	  middle	  and	  upper	  income	  brackets,	  and	  therefore	  does	  
not	  help	  women	  much,	  if	  at	  all	  (Sainsbury	  1999,	  256).	  
	   Social	  democratic	  welfare	  regimes	  are	  characterized	  by	  active	  state	  intervention	  
in	  the	  market;	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state	  is	  to	  temper	  market	  forces,	  toward	  the	  goal	  of	  a	  
greater	  measure	  of	  social	  equality	  (Sainsbury	  1999,	  259).	  The	  state	  promotes	  full	  
employment	  through	  active	  labor	  market	  policies	  and	  it	  expands	  public	  services,	  which	  
are	  considered	  a	  social	  right	  (rather	  than	  commodities	  that	  must	  be	  purchased	  on	  the	  
market	  or	  based	  on	  work	  performance)	  (Sainsbury	  1999,	  259).	  Citizen	  or	  residence-­‐
based	  social	  rights	  dilutes	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  market	  on	  entitlements;	  benefits	  funded	  
through	  general	  revenues	  (rather	  than	  individual	  employee	  contributions)	  does	  the	  
same,	  and	  this	  type	  of	  regime	  has	  positive	  outcomes	  for	  women	  (Sainsbury	  1999,	  259).	  
First,	  social	  rights	  based	  on	  citizenship	  or	  residence	  individualizes	  the	  principle	  behind	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social	  entitlements	  and	  separates	  it	  from	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  family	  (Sainsbury	  1999,	  
260).	  There	  is	  no	  gender	  differentiation	  in	  who	  the	  state	  deems	  entitled	  for	  social	  
insurance,	  and	  the	  state	  does	  not	  recognize	  a	  difference	  between	  (in	  the	  worth	  of)	  paid	  
and	  unpaid	  work	  in	  deciding	  who	  receives	  benefits	  (Sainsbury	  1999,	  260).	  All	  women,	  
employed	  and	  unemployed,	  single	  and	  married,	  have	  access	  to	  social	  entitlements.	  
Second,	  active	  labor	  market	  policy	  helps	  women	  because	  it	  helps	  those	  workers	  that	  are	  
most	  vulnerable	  to	  seasonal	  employment,	  business	  cycle	  fluctuations,	  and	  economic	  
restructuring;	  this	  initially	  benefitted	  men	  in	  social	  welfare	  states,	  but	  had	  the	  ultimate	  
effect	  of	  enhancing	  women’s	  employment	  opportunities	  (Sainsbury	  1999,	  260).	  	  
Final	  Thoughts:	  The	  Welfare	  State	  Theory	  	  	   In	  examining	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  GATT/WTO	  and	  women’s	  rights,	  the	  
welfare	  state	  theory	  predicts	  a	  set	  of	  positive	  effects	  and	  a	  set	  of	  negative	  effects.	  There	  
are	  a	  few	  important	  questions	  that	  the	  specifications	  of	  this	  particular	  theory	  allow	  us	  to	  
answer	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  membership	  in	  the	  GATT/WTO	  and	  women’s	  
rights.	  Given	  that	  all	  states,	  to	  a	  greater	  or	  lesser	  extent,	  use	  some	  form	  of	  welfare	  state	  
polic(ies)	  to	  respond	  to	  increased	  openness,	  if	  a	  state	  is	  a	  member	  of	  the	  GATT/WTO	  (or	  
if	  it	  is	  not),	  and	  therefore	  experiences	  a	  relative	  increase	  in	  its	  level	  of	  trade:	  what	  kind	  
of	  welfare	  state	  policies	  does	  the	  state	  use	  to	  respond	  to	  increased	  vulnerability	  to	  
market	  forces?	  How	  do	  these	  policies	  affect	  who	  is	  and	  is	  not	  included	  in	  these	  types	  of	  
social	  and	  economic	  insurance	  policies?	  Most	  importantly:	  how	  does	  policy	  inclusion	  
and	  exclusion	  affect	  the	  women’s	  rights	  in	  a	  state?	  From	  these	  questions,	  the	  welfare	  
state	  theory	  produces	  the	  following	  testable	  hypotheses	  to	  be	  evaluated	  in	  the	  data	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analysis	  section.	  One,	  if	  a	  state	  is	  a	  member	  of	  the	  GATT/WTO,	  they	  have	  been	  forced	  to	  
use	  welfare	  state	  mechanisms,	  which	  has	  therefore	  had	  a	  positive	  effect	  on	  women’s	  
rights,	  through	  the	  (increased)	  provision	  of	  social	  and	  economic	  insurance.	  Two,	  if	  a	  
state	  is	  a	  member	  of	  the	  WTO,	  they	  have	  been	  forced	  to	  use	  welfare	  state	  mechanisms,	  
which	  therefore	  has	  had	  a	  negative	  effect	  on	  women’s	  rights,	  through	  (a	  lack	  of)	  the	  
provision	  of	  social	  and	  economic	  insurance.	  And,	  three,	  if	  a	  state	  is	  a	  member	  of	  the	  
GATT/WTO,	  they	  have	  been	  forced	  to	  use	  welfare	  state	  mechanisms,	  which	  has	  
therefore	  has	  a	  mixed	  effect	  on	  women’s	  rights.	  
The	  International	  Interactions	  Theory	  	  
In	  this	  section,	  I	  will	  explain	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  international	  interactions	  
theory	  is	  another	  way	  to	  analyze	  the	  relationship	  between	  membership	  in	  the	  
GATT/WTO	  and	  women’s	  rights.	  When	  a	  state	  joins	  an	  international	  institution,	  several	  
changes	  can	  and	  do	  occur	  within	  that	  state.	  This	  is	  mainly	  because	  all	  international	  
institutions	  have	  rules	  member	  states	  must	  follow.	  These	  rules	  pertain	  to	  interactions	  
with	  other	  nations	  as	  well	  as	  having	  a	  state’s	  own	  domestic	  politics	  and	  policies	  conform	  
to	  internationally	  accepted	  norms.	  The	  outcome	  is	  one	  of	  two	  things.	  Being	  bound	  by	  
the	  rules	  of	  an	  institution	  or	  relatedly	  even	  a	  trade	  agreement	  between	  two	  or	  more	  
states	  can	  instigate	  change	  in	  policy	  with	  regard	  to	  women’s	  rights	  through	  a	  variety	  of	  
mechanisms.	  Or	  membership	  can	  constrain.	  This	  can	  either	  present	  itself	  in	  the	  inability	  
of	  policymakers	  to	  institute	  rules	  and	  regulations	  that	  protect	  the	  rights	  of	  groups	  that	  
are	  often	  the	  most	  marginalized,	  or	  the	  inability	  of	  the	  people	  that	  make	  up	  
marginalized	  groups	  to	  exercise	  anything	  beyond	  their	  most	  basic	  human	  rights.	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Top	  Down	  Effects	  on	  Women’s	  (Human)	  Rights	  	  
In	  this	  section,	  I	  will	  elaborate	  on	  the	  causal	  logics	  and	  underlying	  mechanisms	  of	  
the	  international	  interactions	  theory,	  and	  how	  they	  are	  another	  way	  to	  analyze	  the	  
relationship	  between	  membership	  in	  the	  WTO	  and	  women’s	  rights.	  I	  take	  it	  as	  a	  given	  
that	  membership	  increases	  aggregate	  amounts	  of	  trade	  for	  all	  member	  states.	  	  It	  is	  a	  
newer	  but	  important	  fact	  that	  policymakers	  around	  the	  world	  use	  their	  trade	  policies	  to	  
achieve	  human	  rights	  objectives8	  (Aaronson	  2008,	  3).	  Policy	  mechanisms	  relevant	  to	  this	  
theory	  include	  incentives	  such	  as	  increased	  market	  access	  for	  countries	  with	  good	  
human	  rights	  standards,	  disincentives	  such	  as	  trade	  sanctions	  to	  get	  trade	  partners	  to	  
change	  their	  behavior	  with	  regard	  to	  human	  rights,	  and	  linking	  trade	  and	  human	  rights	  
by	  obtaining	  a	  waiver	  from	  their	  (a	  state’s)	  trade	  obligations	  when	  the	  obligations	  are	  in	  
violation	  of	  national	  policies	  that	  are	  meant	  to	  protect	  rights	  (Aaronson	  2008,	  4).	  With	  
regard	  to	  policy	  mechanisms	  in	  WTO	  language	  itself:	  this	  institution	  does	  not	  provide	  
much	  guidance	  with	  regard	  to	  how	  a	  member	  should	  deal	  with	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  a	  
fellow	  member	  and	  trading	  partner	  undermines	  human	  rights,	  nor	  does	  it	  give	  direction	  
as	  to	  how	  members	  can	  promote	  human	  rights	  without	  running	  the	  risk	  of	  distorting	  the	  
free	  flow	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  required	  by	  WTO	  trade	  rules	  (Aaronson	  2008,	  4).	  Though	  
there	  are	  arguments	  that	  the	  public	  morals	  exception	  in	  Article	  XX	  of	  the	  GATT/WTO	  
charter	  could	  possibly	  be	  interpreted	  to	  protect	  women’s	  rights	  when	  a	  state	  signs	  a	  
trade	  agreement	  with	  another	  state(s)	  (Jarvis	  2000/2001,	  219),	  the	  current	  WTO	  system	  
outlines	  what	  governments	  cannot	  do,	  but	  not	  what	  they	  can	  do	  (Aaronson	  2008,	  4).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  	  For	  literature	  equating	  human	  rights	  with	  women’s	  rights,	  and	  arguments	  that	  struggle	  to	  improve	  human	  rights	  will	  improve	  
women’s	  rights	  on	  a	  global	  scale,	  see	  (Bunch	  1990;	  Engle	  1991-­‐1992;	  Grewal	  1999;	  Neuhold	  2005)	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However,	  this	  theory	  includes	  or	  subsumes	  several	  top-­‐down	  mechanisms	  that	  affect	  
outcomes	  with	  regard	  to,	  or	  at	  the	  very	  least	  change	  the	  way	  in	  which	  a	  state	  thinks	  
about,	  women’s	  rights.	  Again,	  it	  predicts	  either	  that	  a	  state,	  as	  a	  member,	  will	  be	  more	  
likely	  to	  change	  its	  policies	  for	  the	  better	  with	  regard	  to	  women’s	  rights	  (or	  will	  be	  
forced	  to),	  or	  that	  it	  will	  be	  constrained	  and	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  do	  so,	  whatever	  it	  may	  
wish	  to	  do	  (and	  whatever	  the	  women	  in	  the	  state	  may	  desire).	  
The	  Positive	  Case	  	  
	   Top	  down	  effects	  are	  those	  international	  level	  variables	  that	  directly	  affect	  policy	  
in	  a	  state,	  which	  subsequently	  affect	  the	  rights	  of	  its	  citizens.	  	  According	  to	  the	  
specifications	  of	  this	  theory,	  this	  can	  affect	  women’s	  rights	  through	  a	  few	  different	  types	  
of	  mechanisms.	  For	  example:	  multinational	  corporations	  that	  come	  in	  and	  set	  up	  
factories	  in	  developing	  countries	  and	  provide	  jobs	  for	  people	  in	  those	  countries	  (Amao	  
2009,	  421).	  In	  international	  law,	  the	  MNC	  is	  not	  an	  entity	  that	  is	  directly	  bound	  by	  
international	  rules	  and	  regulations	  (Amao	  2009,	  421);	  however	  the	  MNC	  is	  a	  huge	  and	  
important	  part	  of	  the	  international	  trade	  regime,	  which	  includes	  international	  trade	  
agreements	  between	  two	  or	  more	  states	  and	  the	  institution	  of	  the	  GATT/WTO.	  This	  is	  
demonstrated	  in	  looking	  at	  trade	  relations	  between	  the	  European	  Union	  or	  EU,	  and	  the	  
African-­‐Caribbean-­‐Pacific	  group	  of	  states	  or	  ACP	  states.	  The	  role	  of	  the	  EU	  (in	  promoting	  
rights)	  is	  important	  because	  EU	  member	  states	  are	  the	  major	  domiciles	  of	  many	  MNCs	  
that	  have	  set	  up	  shop	  in	  ACP	  states	  (Amao	  2009,	  421).	  The	  EU	  has	  a	  “highly	  developed	  
institutional	  and	  legal	  framework”;	  this	  has	  great	  potential	  to	  affect	  the	  accountability	  
of	  MNCs	  to	  human	  rights	  standards	  for	  its	  workers	  (Amao	  2009,	  421).	  This	  is	  a	  form	  of	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top	  down	  policy	  change	  from	  a	  trade	  partnership	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  ACP	  states;	  
through	  having	  multiple	  MNCs	  in	  these	  states,	  the	  EU	  exerts	  influence	  by	  demanding	  
that	  MNCs	  in	  host	  states	  not	  violate	  human	  rights	  standards	  for	  the	  people	  they	  employ	  
(Amao	  2009,	  399).	  Because	  EU	  states	  always	  incorporate	  human	  rights	  standards	  into	  
their	  trade	  agreements	  with	  other	  countries,	  it	  also	  has	  the	  effect	  of	  a	  nudge	  in	  the	  right	  
direction	  for	  the	  governments	  of	  host	  states,	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  rights	  they	  allot	  to	  their	  
most	  vulnerable	  citizens	  (most	  often	  women	  and	  ethnic	  minorities)	  (Amao	  2009,	  399).	  
	   Another	  mechanism	  through	  which	  membership	  can	  affect	  women’s	  rights	  is:	  
there	  is	  evidence	  that	  membership	  in	  this	  institution	  may	  have	  the	  effect	  of	  improving	  
member	  governments’	  respect	  for	  some	  democratic	  rights	  (Aaronson	  2011).	  This	  is	  
similar	  to	  the	  diffusion	  of	  improvements	  in	  human	  rights	  standards	  through	  agreements	  
between	  MNCs	  and	  third	  world	  governments.	  In	  this	  case,	  language	  in	  the	  GATT/WTO	  
agreement	  itself	  requires	  member	  governments	  to	  adopt	  policies	  that	  provide	  due	  
process	  and	  political	  participation	  rights	  to	  foreign	  producers	  (Aaronson	  2011,	  26).	  
Though	  these	  rights	  originate	  from	  trade	  agreements	  between	  foreign	  producers	  and	  
host	  governments,	  member	  nations	  also	  provide	  these	  rights	  to	  their	  citizens	  (Aaronson	  
2011,	  26).	  Government	  respect	  for	  these	  types	  of	  (political)	  rights	  improves,	  the	  longer	  a	  
state	  has	  been	  a	  member	  of	  the	  GATT/WTO	  (Aaronson	  2011,	  26).	  This	  has	  two	  effects	  
on	  rights	  for	  people	  in	  member	  states.	  First,	  because	  the	  aforementioned	  types	  of	  
political	  rights	  are	  provided	  to	  foreign	  producers	  as	  well	  as	  to	  the	  people	  living	  and	  
working	  in	  host	  states,	  a	  increasing	  number	  of	  these	  people	  have	  learned	  how	  to	  
influence	  and	  even	  change	  trade	  and	  trade-­‐related	  policies	  (Aaronson	  2011,	  26).	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Second,	  trade	  ranges	  from	  affecting	  policies	  related	  to	  taxes,	  food	  safety,	  and	  worker’s	  
rights,	  and	  it	  is	  very	  likely	  that	  people	  in	  host	  countries	  will	  use	  the	  skills	  learned	  from	  
changing	  trade	  policies	  to	  affect	  change	  in	  other	  public	  policies	  (Aaronson	  2011,	  26).	  
Positive	  change	  in	  political	  rights,	  and	  possible	  future	  changes	  in	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  policies	  
related	  to	  international	  trade,	  are	  arguably	  easily	  related	  to	  outcomes	  for	  women	  
through	  a	  number	  of	  channels.	  The	  most	  direct	  manner	  is	  through	  the	  spread	  of	  the	  
rights	  to	  political	  participation	  and	  due	  process	  to	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  the	  population.	  
Citizen	  action	  to	  change	  and	  challenge	  trade	  policies-­‐-­‐insofar	  as	  the	  outcomes	  are	  
positive	  for	  workers	  in	  host	  countries—affects	  all	  or	  at	  the	  very	  least	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  
working	  population,	  and	  therefore	  confers	  more	  rights	  to	  women,	  as	  employees	  and	  as	  
citizens.	  Finally,	  citizens	  have	  learned	  how	  to	  affect	  change	  in	  trade	  policies,	  and	  can	  
now	  possibly	  change	  a	  host	  of	  policies	  related	  to	  trade;	  this	  means	  possible	  
improvements	  for	  women’s	  rights.	  
Another	  mechanism,	  according	  to	  this	  theory,	  that	  helps	  to	  analyze	  the	  
relationship	  between	  membership	  and	  women’s	  rights	  is	  effects	  that	  come	  from	  
relations	  among	  states	  in	  the	  international	  economy.	  For	  example,	  governments	  
sometimes	  incorporate	  human	  rights	  standards	  when	  joining	  a	  preferential	  trade	  
agreement,	  or	  PTA.	  A	  PTA	  is	  an	  international	  trade	  agreement	  between	  two	  or	  more	  
states	  that	  gives	  preferential	  access	  to	  member	  states.	  Preferential	  access	  usual	  means	  
reducing	  tariffs	  and	  is	  a	  step	  toward	  economic	  integration.	  While	  democratic	  
governments	  most	  frequently	  pursue	  “strategies	  of	  change”,	  incorporating	  human	  rights	  
standards	  into	  their	  trade	  agreements,	  other	  types	  of	  governments	  are	  also	  very	  likely	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to	  do	  so,	  and	  to	  be	  willing	  to	  adapt	  trade	  agreements	  so	  that	  they	  govern	  human	  rights	  
principles	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways	  (Hafner-­‐Burton	  2008b,	  42).	  While	  increased	  access	  to	  
markets	  for	  more	  goods	  and	  services	  can	  be	  beneficial	  for	  a	  state,	  there	  are	  associated	  
costs	  in	  the	  form	  of	  externally	  enforced	  sovereignty	  with	  regard	  to	  human	  rights	  
standards	  (Hafner-­‐Burton	  2008b,	  57).	  Even	  though	  a	  state	  might	  be	  better	  off	  not	  giving	  
up	  some	  of	  their	  internal	  sovereignty	  (Hafner-­‐Burton	  2008b,	  58),	  if	  externally	  enforced	  
standards	  with	  regard	  to	  human	  rights	  actually	  improve	  the	  rights	  of	  people	  in	  that	  
state,	  and	  especially	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  most	  marginalized	  people	  (i.e.	  women),	  from	  a	  
normative	  standpoint,	  sovereignty	  costs	  are	  worth	  improvements	  for	  people	  in	  states	  
with	  less	  relative	  economic	  bargaining	  leverage.	  
	   More	  generally,	  providing	  for	  and	  promoting	  basic	  human	  rights	  is	  increasingly	  
becoming	  a	  “norm”	  in	  international	  politics.	  Norms	  and	  the	  spread	  of	  norms	  (in	  this	  case	  
the	  norms	  of	  better	  or	  worse	  rights	  for	  women	  in	  policy	  and	  in	  practice)	  are	  also	  
another	  causal	  mechanism(s)	  that	  explain	  how	  membership	  affects	  women’s	  rights.	  
Norms	  in	  international	  politics	  can	  spread	  from	  state	  to	  state	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways.	  
Epistemic	  communities	  and	  international	  institutions	  serve	  as	  “experts”	  to	  define	  
economic	  progress	  and	  human	  rights	  standards	  (Simmons	  2004).	  Powerful	  nations	  and	  
international	  financial	  institutions	  can	  force	  less	  powerful	  nations	  to	  abide	  by	  certain	  
norms,	  in	  exchange	  for	  aid	  or	  to	  avoid	  trade	  sanctions	  (Simmons	  2004;	  Hafner-­‐Burton	  
2008c).	  Norms	  can	  diffuse	  as	  countries	  compete	  with	  one	  another	  to	  attract	  investment	  
and	  to	  sell	  exports	  by	  liberalizing	  the	  flow	  of	  capital	  and	  reducing	  tariff	  barriers	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(Simmons	  2004).	  Finally,	  states	  may	  learn	  about	  good	  and	  bad	  policy	  norms,	  from	  their	  
own	  experiences	  as	  well	  as	  from	  the	  policy	  experiments	  of	  other	  states	  (Simmons	  2004).	  	  
The	  Negative	  Case	  	  
	   In	  the	  negative	  case,	  a	  government’s	  ability	  to	  either	  codify	  or	  enforce	  women’s	  
human	  rights	  is	  constrained	  by	  top	  down	  forces	  over	  which	  they	  have	  little	  to	  no	  
control.	  The	  top-­‐down	  forces	  are	  the	  mechanisms	  that	  connect	  membership	  to	  
[negative]	  effects	  on	  women’s	  rights.	  One	  example	  of	  this	  is	  the	  lack	  of	  gender-­‐specific	  
concerns	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  legal	  framework	  of	  trade	  agreements	  and	  an	  absence	  
of	  women	  in	  the	  role	  of	  negotiators	  at	  GATT/WTO	  trade	  talks;	  the	  result	  is	  the	  interests	  
of	  women	  not	  being	  adequately	  represented	  in	  the	  institutional	  structure	  of	  the	  
GATT/WTO	  (Mengesha	  2006,	  10).	  This	  has	  a	  few	  effects	  on	  women’s	  rights.	  First,	  
increased	  trade	  liberalization	  because	  of	  the	  GATT/WTO	  has	  significantly	  contributed	  to	  
the	  feminization	  of	  labor,	  especially	  in	  developing	  countries,	  and	  it	  has	  changed	  the	  
nature	  and	  burden	  of	  women’s	  work	  (Mengesha	  2006,	  10).	  While	  an	  increase	  in	  job	  
opportunities	  for	  women	  is	  a	  positive,	  working	  conditions	  and	  the	  increased	  burden	  that	  
working	  places	  on	  women’s	  reproductive	  roles	  is	  a	  reminder	  that	  increased	  job	  
opportunities	  come	  at	  a	  cost	  for	  many	  women	  around	  the	  world	  (Mengesha	  2006,	  10).	  
Second	  and	  related,	  the	  constraining	  forces	  of	  globalization,	  including	  the	  deepening	  of	  
market	  integration	  and	  increased	  trade	  openness	  that	  is	  currently	  driving	  growth	  in	  the	  
global	  economy,	  disproportionately	  victimizes	  women	  (Mengesha	  2006,	  10).	  It	  does	  so	  
through	  the	  mechanism	  of	  the	  weakening	  of	  the	  state	  in	  a	  globalized	  economy.	  If	  a	  state	  
wants	  to	  remain	  a	  global	  competitor	  and	  attract	  business,	  it	  lowers	  wages,	  which	  has	  a	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disproportionate	  impact	  on	  those	  that	  already	  make	  the	  least	  (women)	  (Mengesha	  
2006,	  10).	  
	   Another	  mechanism	  that	  constrains	  the	  ability	  of	  states	  to	  protect	  and	  enforce	  
rights	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  power	  politics	  between	  states	  creates	  different	  material	  roles	  
for	  states	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  global	  economy.	  International	  trade	  is	  about	  the	  
exchange	  of	  money	  and	  goods,	  but	  it	  also	  creates	  power	  relations	  between	  states	  
because	  of	  disparities	  in	  relative	  economic	  power	  (Hafner-­‐Burton	  2008a,	  1).	  Countries	  
with	  less	  wealth,	  and	  therefore	  less	  economic	  power,	  are	  less	  able	  to	  defend	  their	  
interested	  in	  an	  increasingly	  integrated	  global	  economy	  (Hafner-­‐Burton	  2008a,	  1).	  The	  
formal	  organization	  that	  regulates	  international	  trade	  generates	  “informal	  social	  
networks”	  through	  the	  joint	  membership	  of	  several	  states;	  these	  social	  networks	  give	  
the	  already	  more	  economically	  powerful	  states	  more	  “social	  capital”	  than	  those	  with	  
less	  relative	  economic	  power	  (Hafner-­‐Burton	  2008a,	  1).	  This	  adds	  a	  social	  dimension	  to	  
economic	  power	  politics	  with	  regard	  to	  international	  trade	  agreements,	  and	  
consequently	  affects	  how	  economic	  gains	  (from	  these	  agreements)	  are	  distributed	  
unequally	  (Hafner-­‐Burton	  2008a,	  1).	  When	  gains	  are	  unequal,	  the	  people	  living	  and	  
working	  in	  states	  that	  end	  up	  with	  the	  short	  end	  of	  the	  stick	  in	  a	  trade	  agreement	  suffer,	  
and	  those	  most	  vulnerable	  (women)	  suffer	  the	  most.	  
The	  International	  Interactions	  Theory:	  Final	  Thoughts	  	  	   The	  international	  interactions	  theory	  is	  useful	  in	  thinking	  about	  ways	  to	  answer	  a	  
few	  important	  questions	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  membership	  in	  the	  GATT/WTO	  
and	  women’s	  rights.	  If	  a	  state	  is	  a	  member	  of	  the	  GATT/WTO	  and/or	  a	  related	  trade	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agreement	  and	  consequently	  must	  change	  something	  about	  its	  domestic	  politics	  or	  
policies	  as	  a	  member:	  What	  policies	  are	  changed?	  How	  much	  are	  policies	  changed?	  
When	  and	  why	  are	  states	  able	  to	  or	  forced	  to	  resist	  changing	  policy?	  Finally,	  what	  is	  the	  
specific	  effect	  on	  women’s	  rights?	  From	  these	  broad	  questions,	  this	  theory	  produces	  the	  
following	  testable	  hypothesis	  that	  can	  be	  evaluated	  by	  the	  results	  of	  the	  models	  in	  the	  
data	  analysis	  sections.	  One,	  if	  a	  state	  is	  a	  member	  of	  the	  GATT/WTO	  or	  a	  related	  trade	  
agreement,	  it	  is	  able	  to	  or	  forced	  to	  make	  positive	  changes	  to	  its	  policies	  that	  affect	  the	  
rights	  and	  opportunities	  of	  women.	  Two,	  if	  a	  state	  is	  a	  member	  of	  the	  GATT/WTO	  or	  
related	  trade	  agreement,	  it	  is	  constrained	  or	  unable	  to	  make	  changes	  to	  its	  policies	  that	  
affect	  the	  rights	  and	  opportunities	  of	  women,	  thus	  resulting	  in	  no	  change	  or	  negative	  
change.	  Three,	  if	  a	  state	  is	  a	  member	  of	  the	  GATT/WTO	  or	  a	  related	  trade	  agreement,	  is	  
willingly	  or	  is	  forced	  to	  makes	  changes,	  but	  the	  outcomes	  for	  women	  are	  mixed.	  
The	  Trade	  Flows	  Theory	  	  
The	  trade	  flows	  theory	  predicts	  a	  set	  of	  positive	  outcomes	  and	  a	  set	  of	  negative	  
outcomes	  for	  women’s	  rights.	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  will	  briefly	  lay	  out	  the	  mechanisms	  that	  in	  
each	  case	  connect	  membership	  in	  the	  GATT/WTO	  to	  effects	  on	  women’s	  rights.	  On	  the	  
one	  hand,	  there	  is	  a	  wealth	  of	  evidence	  that	  membership	  in	  the	  GATT/WTO	  increases	  
imports	  and	  exports	  for	  all	  states,	  which	  grows	  their	  economies	  and	  creates	  new	  
employment	  opportunities	  for	  all	  people	  in	  member	  states.	  The	  effect	  of	  more	  jobs	  is	  
that	  many	  women	  are	  able	  to	  work	  in	  paid	  positions	  for	  the	  first	  time;	  paid	  employment	  
gives	  women	  more	  status	  in	  the	  household	  and	  more	  autonomy	  outside	  the	  home.	  
Finally,	  as	  the	  export	  sector	  grows,	  there	  is	  more	  demand	  for	  female	  employees,	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resulting	  in	  even	  more	  jobs	  for	  women.	  One	  the	  other	  hand,	  there	  is	  evidence	  that	  while	  
joining	  the	  GATT/WTO	  does	  increase	  imports	  and	  exports	  for	  all	  states,	  the	  resulting	  
economic	  growth	  is	  distributed	  unevenly	  among	  states	  in	  the	  international	  economy,	  
which	  actually	  means	  less	  employment	  opportunities,	  or	  employment	  opportunities	  
being	  taken	  away	  from	  many	  in	  some	  states.	  To	  whatever	  extent	  that	  there	  are	  new	  or	  
more	  jobs	  in	  a	  state,	  the	  international	  and	  gendered	  division	  of	  labor	  has	  more	  than	  a	  
few	  negative	  outcomes	  for	  women:	  low	  wages,	  poor	  working	  conditions,	  adjustment	  
burdens	  for	  women	  in	  industries	  than	  cannot	  compete	  because	  of	  increased	  openness,	  
women	  competing	  with	  other	  women	  for	  jobs	  as	  sectors	  become	  uncompetitive,	  and	  
women’s	  jobs	  seen	  as	  expendable	  when	  the	  economy	  contracts.	  
The	  Positive	  Case	  	  	   Here	  I	  will	  elaborate	  on	  a	  set	  of	  mechanisms	  that	  this	  theory	  gives	  us	  to	  
understand	  the	  connection	  between	  membership	  and	  (positive)	  effects	  on	  women’s	  
rights.	  The	  increase	  in	  imports	  and	  exports	  as	  a	  result	  of	  joining	  the	  GATT/WTO	  causes	  
aggregate	  economic	  growth	  for	  member	  states;	  the	  resultant	  increase	  in	  per	  capita	  
income	  leads	  to	  aggregate	  improvements	  in	  several	  measures	  of	  gender	  equality	  (Dollar	  
1999,	  21).	  For	  example,	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  impact	  on	  women’s	  labor	  rights	  in	  developing	  
countries,	  the	  increase	  in	  international	  trade	  as	  a	  result	  of	  membership	  has	  created	  
more	  work	  opportunities	  for	  women,	  which	  helps	  them	  to	  gain	  autonomy	  and	  allows	  
them	  to	  participate	  more	  actively	  in	  public	  society	  (Balciunaite	  2008).	  In	  a	  number	  of	  
cases	  specific	  to	  developing	  countries,	  international	  trade	  has	  contributed	  to	  a	  
redistribution	  of	  income	  to	  women	  (Tran-­‐Nguyen	  2004,	  xi).	  This	  is	  a	  result	  of	  the	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creation	  of	  more	  jobs	  and	  general	  business	  opportunities	  (because	  of	  increased	  
international	  trade)	  in	  the	  manufacturing	  and	  service	  sectors	  of	  these	  states’	  economies	  
(Tran-­‐Nguyen	  2004,	  xi).	  Women	  in	  these	  states	  now	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  earn	  income;	  this	  
gives	  them	  more	  status	  in	  the	  household	  and	  in	  society	  (Tran-­‐Nguyen	  2004,	  xi).	  
Developing	  countries	  benefit	  from	  female	  workers;	  their	  work	  in	  large	  part	  contributes	  
to	  increased	  export	  competitiveness	  and	  industrial	  diversification	  (Tran-­‐Nguyen	  2004,	  
xi).	  
	   In	  OECD	  countries,	  economic	  growth	  from	  increased	  trade	  has	  created	  more	  jobs	  
for	  women,	  which	  has	  brought	  more	  household	  resources	  under	  their	  control	  and	  
allowed	  them	  to	  invest	  in	  healthcare	  and	  education	  for	  future	  generations	  (Korinek	  
2005).	  Specific	  to	  Latin	  America,	  trade	  liberalization	  has	  improved	  women’s	  market	  
outcomes	  (Tellez	  2010,	  19).	  Women	  now	  earn	  higher	  wages	  relative	  to	  what	  they	  
earned	  before,	  and	  the	  gender	  wage	  gap	  has	  decreased	  (Tellez	  2010,	  19).	  	  In	  addition,	  
both	  between	  and	  within	  industry	  shifts	  have	  provided	  increased	  employment	  
opportunities	  for	  women	  (Tellez	  2010,	  20).	  Women	  have	  been	  able	  to	  translate	  power	  
gained	  from	  new	  and	  increased	  earnings	  to	  bargaining	  power	  within	  the	  household;	  
household	  expenditures	  have	  shifted	  from	  male	  oriented	  goods	  to	  female	  oriented	  
goods	  (women’s	  clothing	  and	  providing	  for	  children’s	  education)	  (Tellez	  2010,	  20).	  
The	  Negative	  Case	  	  	   Here	  I	  explain	  the	  mechanisms	  that	  connect	  membership	  to	  negative	  effects	  on	  
women’s	  rights.	  I	  then	  briefly	  discuss	  four	  negative	  outcomes	  that	  this	  theory	  and	  real	  
world	  evidence	  argue	  are	  a	  commonality	  for	  women:	  low	  wages,	  poor	  working	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conditions,	  competition	  between	  sectors	  and	  therefore	  between	  women,	  and	  the	  
feminization	  of	  labor.	  In	  the	  previous	  section,	  I	  elaborated	  on	  arguments	  for	  the	  positive	  
effects	  of	  international	  trade	  institutions	  on	  economic	  growth;	  there	  are	  also	  arguments	  
that	  find	  the	  opposite:	  international	  trade	  law	  and	  institutions	  distort	  economic	  growth	  
and	  in	  some	  cases,	  cause	  negative	  growth	  (Paul	  2003/2004,	  287).	  While	  an	  increase	  of	  
both	  imports	  and	  exports	  is	  usually	  regarded	  as	  beneficial	  to	  a	  state’s	  economy,	  and	  
increased	  exports	  generate	  more	  jobs,	  increased	  trade	  also	  means	  a	  loss	  of	  jobs	  for	  
many	  (Aho	  1981,	  29).	  The	  losses	  fall	  mainly	  on	  workers	  in	  import-­‐competing	  sectors;	  
these	  workers	  must	  adapt	  to	  changing	  demand	  conditions,	  which	  involves	  extended	  
periods	  of	  job	  search,	  retraining,	  and	  relocation	  (Aho	  1981,	  29).	  This	  process	  is	  costly	  
and	  the	  burden	  of	  adjustment	  falls	  most	  heavily	  on	  women,	  minorities,	  the	  less	  
educated,	  and	  the	  lowest	  paid	  (Aho	  1981,	  29).	  	   The	  structure	  of	  both	  the	  international	  economy	  and	  domestic	  labor	  markets	  is	  
such	  that	  trade	  liberalization	  comes	  along	  with	  occupational	  segregation	  between	  
genders,	  both	  horizontal	  and	  vertical	  (Randriamo	  2006,	  16-­‐20).	  Women	  tend	  to	  be	  hired	  
for	  jobs	  that	  require	  fewer	  skills	  than	  jobs	  given	  to	  men,	  their	  wages	  are	  almost	  always	  
lower,	  and	  they	  work	  in	  unhealthy	  and	  exploitative	  conditions	  (Randriamo	  2006,	  16-­‐20).	  
Women	  most	  often	  work	  in	  industries	  where	  capital	  is	  more	  mobile	  (for	  example,	  
footwear);	  these	  industries	  are	  very	  sensitive	  to	  foreign	  competition	  and	  contraction	  
during	  a	  downturn	  in	  the	  market	  (Randriamo	  2006,	  16-­‐20).	  Retrenchment	  affects	  
women	  much	  more	  severely	  than	  men;	  their	  jobs	  are	  the	  first	  to	  go	  when	  demand	  
contracts	  (Randriamo	  2006,	  16-­‐20).	  
	   28	  
	   The	  international	  division	  of	  labor	  focuses	  on	  the	  repercussions	  for	  women	  in	  
states	  that	  have	  a	  comparative	  advantage	  in	  labor-­‐intensive	  manufacturing	  goods.	  In	  
developed	  and	  developing	  countries,	  gender	  wage	  inequality	  and	  lower	  educational	  
attainment	  rates	  for	  women	  are	  positively	  associated	  with	  a	  comparative	  advantage	  in	  
labor-­‐intensive	  commodities	  (Busse	  2006).	  MNCs	  have	  moved	  assembly-­‐line	  production	  
processes	  from	  the	  global	  north	  to	  the	  global	  south;	  their	  workforce	  is	  most	  often	  70-­‐
90%	  female	  and	  their	  rationale	  for	  moving	  to	  these	  states	  is	  to	  evade	  tariffs,	  worker	  
health	  and	  safety	  laws,	  minimum	  wage	  requirements,	  and	  environmental	  regulations	  
(Runyan	  2003,	  140).	  Across	  third	  world	  countries,	  female	  workers	  are	  paid	  two	  dollars	  a	  
day	  or	  less,	  experience	  sexual	  harassment	  and	  unsafe	  working	  conditions,	  and	  live	  in	  
poverty	  and	  squalor	  (Runyan	  2003,	  140).	  	  	  	   While	  growth	  from	  increased	  imports	  and	  exports	  brings	  more	  jobs	  to	  the	  
economy	  in	  states	  across	  the	  world,	  across	  states	  and	  over	  time	  within	  states,	  there	  is	  a	  
positive	  link	  between	  gender	  wage	  inequality	  and	  economic	  growth	  (Seguino	  2000,	  13).	  
The	  specific	  effect	  is	  this:	  gender	  wage	  inequality	  stimulates	  investment;	  low	  wages	  for	  
women	  enables	  states	  to	  increase	  exports	  and	  technology	  imports	  (Seguino	  2000,	  13).	  
The	  ability	  to	  pay	  workers	  low	  wages	  is	  the	  main	  reason	  companies	  move	  to	  third	  world	  
countries;	  up	  to	  90%	  of	  people	  employed	  as	  light	  assembly	  workers	  are	  women	  (Fuentes	  
1984,	  12).	  Women	  earn	  less	  than	  men	  in	  developed	  and	  developing	  countries	  alike;	  
their	  earning	  are	  considered	  “supplementary	  income”	  for	  their	  families	  (Fuentes	  1984,	  
12).	  Management	  uses	  women’s	  secondary	  status	  to	  pay	  them	  less	  and	  to	  justify	  job	  
cuts	  during	  periods	  of	  decreased	  demand,	  claiming	  “women	  don’t	  need	  to	  work	  and	  will	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probably	  just	  get	  married	  anyway”	  (Fuentes	  1984,	  12).	  Finally,	  most	  MNC	  employers	  
prefer	  single	  women	  with	  no	  children	  and	  no	  plans	  to	  conceive;	  pregnancy	  tests	  are	  a	  
regular	  occurrence	  in	  third	  world	  factories,	  so	  that	  employers	  can	  avoid	  giving	  out	  
maternity	  benefits	  (if	  such	  benefits	  are	  something	  they	  provide)	  (Fuentes	  1984,	  13).	  	   The	  feminization	  of	  labor,	  which	  ties	  into	  both	  the	  international	  division	  of	  labor	  
and	  the	  issue	  of	  lower	  wages	  for	  women,	  is	  basically	  that	  while	  more	  women	  have	  
entered	  the	  labor	  force	  in	  developed	  and	  developing	  countries,	  quantitative	  increases	  in	  
employment	  have	  not	  been	  met	  with	  improvements	  such	  as	  better	  working	  conditions,	  
higher	  wages,	  and	  job	  security	  (Ghosh	  1999,	  47).	  This	  is	  especially	  prevalent	  in	  export-­‐
oriented	  manufacturing	  production;	  sex-­‐segregation	  in	  jobs	  is	  increasingly	  common	  not	  
only	  in	  “traditionally	  female”	  jobs,	  but	  also	  in	  newer	  industries	  that	  do	  not	  need	  to	  be	  
segmented	  by	  gender	  (Ghosh	  1999,	  47).	  There	  is	  also	  discrimination	  between	  women	  
because	  of	  age	  and	  marital	  status;	  employers	  prefer	  young,	  childless,	  single	  women	  
(Ghosh	  1999,	  47).	  Finally,	  women	  across	  the	  board	  make	  up	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  
unemployed	  and	  underemployed	  (Ghosh	  1999,	  47).	  
	   International	  trade	  in	  goods	  and	  services	  and	  foreign	  investment	  have	  grown	  
tremendously	  as	  a	  share	  of	  GDP	  across	  all	  states	  (Standig	  1999,	  584).	  Trade	  and	  
investment	  is	  attracted	  to	  states	  with	  economies	  in	  which	  labor	  costs	  are	  low,	  labor	  
productivity	  is	  high,	  and	  nonwage	  labor	  costs	  are	  minimal	  (Standig	  1999,	  584).	  Labor	  
rights	  are	  seen	  as	  costs	  of	  production	  to	  be	  avoided	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  remaining	  or	  
enhancing	  a	  state’s	  competitiveness	  in	  the	  international	  economy	  (Standig	  1999,	  584).	  
The	  increased	  emphasis	  on	  the	  cost	  of	  labor	  has	  led	  to	  greater	  use	  of	  alternative	  forms	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of	  employment	  (Standig	  1999,	  584).	  Men	  are	  relatively	  protected	  as	  full-­‐time	  wage	  
laborers	  and	  are,	  when	  available,	  eligible	  for	  social	  benefits	  as	  full-­‐time	  employees	  while	  
employers	  can	  use	  female	  employees	  at	  will	  through	  sub-­‐contacting,	  homeworking,	  and	  
as	  a	  “permanent	  temporary	  workforce”	  (Williams	  2002,	  4).	  	   Even	  in	  the	  best	  of	  economic	  and	  working	  conditions,	  employment	  does	  not	  
benefit	  all	  women;	  one	  woman’s	  gain	  may	  be	  another	  woman’s	  loss	  (Wee	  1998,	  6).	  
Under	  conditions	  of	  increased	  trade	  liberalization,	  states	  are	  forced	  to	  compete	  against	  
each	  other	  to	  remain	  relevant	  in	  the	  global	  economy.	  A	  hidden	  consequence	  of	  trade	  
liberalization	  is	  women	  in	  different	  states	  competing	  against	  one	  another	  for	  jobs,	  
wages,	  social	  benefits,	  etc.	  (Wee	  1998,	  7).	  The	  outcomes	  for	  women	  are	  the	  further	  
driving	  down	  of	  wages	  and	  safe	  working	  conditions,	  the	  provision	  of	  benefits,	  and	  other	  
rights	  as	  economies	  try	  to	  stay	  competitive	  (Wee	  1998,	  7).	  
	   In	  a	  globalized	  economy,	  states	  operating	  under	  conditions	  of	  comparative	  
advantage	  will	  necessarily	  have	  some	  sectors	  become	  uncompetitive;	  those	  working	  in	  
these	  sectors	  will	  lose	  their	  jobs.	  For	  example,	  in	  trade	  between	  MERCOSUR	  and	  the	  EU,	  
agriculture	  is	  the	  main	  export	  sector	  in	  MERCOSUR	  states,	  growing	  slowly	  but	  steadily,	  
and	  manufacturing	  is	  import-­‐competing,	  facing	  severe	  import	  competition	  from	  the	  EU	  
(van	  Staveren	  2002,	  26).	  The	  increasingly	  feminized	  manufacturing	  sector	  in	  these	  states	  
is	  vulnerable	  to	  severe	  job	  loss	  because	  of	  trade;	  it	  stands	  to	  reason	  that	  women	  
working	  in	  the	  manufacturing	  sector	  in	  EU	  states	  do	  not	  face	  this	  same	  issue	  (van	  
Staveren	  2002,	  26).	  More	  broadly,	  in	  developing	  countries,	  women	  working	  in	  the	  
agricultural	  sector	  suffer	  from	  increasing	  job	  loss	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  growing	  import-­‐
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competition	  from	  openness	  to	  trade	  while	  many	  their	  counterparts	  in	  manufacturing	  
find	  increased	  employment	  opportunities	  (Tran-­‐Nguyen	  2004,	  xii).	  
Final	  Thoughts	  on	  the	  Trade	  Flows	  Theory	  	  	   The	  trade	  flows	  theory	  gives	  us	  a	  way	  to	  answer	  some	  important	  questions	  
about	  the	  connection	  between	  membership	  in	  the	  GATT/WTO	  and	  women’s	  rights.	  If	  a	  
state	  is	  a	  member	  of	  this	  institution	  and	  has	  experienced	  an	  increase	  in	  imports	  and	  
exports,	  does	  its	  economy	  experience	  growth?	  Who	  loses	  out	  in	  the	  growth	  process?	  	  
When	  growth	  happens	  and	  jobs	  are	  created,	  do	  these	  job	  opportunities	  help	  or	  hurt	  
women,	  on	  the	  aggregate?	  What	  other	  opportunities	  and	  new	  rights	  do	  new	  job	  
opportunities	  because	  of	  increased	  trade	  bring	  to	  women?	  From	  these	  questions,	  the	  
trade	  flows	  theory	  generates	  a	  set	  of	  hypotheses,	  to	  be	  tested	  and	  evaluated	  in	  the	  data	  
analysis	  section.	  One,	  a	  member	  state	  will	  experience	  aggregate	  economic	  growth	  and	  
this	  will	  result	  in	  an	  overall	  benefit	  for	  women.	  Two,	  a	  member	  state	  will	  experience	  
aggregate	  economic	  growth	  and	  this	  will	  result	  in	  an	  overall	  harmful	  effect	  for	  women’s	  
rights.	  Three,	  a	  member	  state	  will	  experience	  aggregate	  growth	  and	  this	  will	  result	  in	  
mixed	  outcomes	  for	  women.	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CHAPTER	  III	  
DATA	  ANALYSIS	  	  
Description	  	  
To	  analyze	  the	  relationship	  between	  membership	  in	  the	  GATT/WTO	  and	  
women’s	  rights,	  this	  study	  uses	  four	  fixed	  effects	  models.	  	  Fixed	  effects	  models	  tell	  us	  
how	  the	  variation	  over	  time	  in	  the	  independent	  or	  explanatory	  variables	  correlates	  with	  
the	  variation	  over	  time	  in	  the	  dependent	  variable.	  Every	  state	  will	  have	  its	  own	  baseline	  
average	  level	  of	  women’s	  rights;	  this	  type	  of	  model	  deals	  with	  this	  (with	  differences	  
across	  countries)	  by	  allowing	  each	  to	  have	  its	  own	  separate	  intercept.	  By	  doing	  so,	  we	  
can	  most	  accurately	  understand	  and	  compare	  differences	  across	  states	  and	  within	  
states.	  	  	  
The	  four	  models	  used	  in	  this	  study	  utilize	  data	  from	  the	  World	  Bank’s	  World	  
Development	  Indicators,9	  the	  Polity	  IV	  Project,10	  and	  the	  Cingranelli	  and	  Richards	  
Human	  Rights	  Data	  Project.11	  The	  dependent	  variable,	  women’s	  rights	  (Table	  1),	  is	  a	  
measure	  of	  the	  “rights	  to	  legal	  protection	  and	  equal	  treatment	  politically,	  economically,	  
and	  socially”	  (Cingranelli	  2010,	  403).	  The	  rights	  included	  in	  this	  data	  set	  are	  
internationally	  recognized	  rights,	  and	  the	  data	  measures	  the	  rights	  for	  women	  under	  the	  
law	  in	  a	  state	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  state	  enforces	  these	  rights	  (and	  conversely,	  to	  
what	  extent	  discrimination	  against	  women	  exists).	  The	  CIRI	  Human	  Rights	  Data	  Project	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  (World	  Development	  Indicators	  	  2013)	  
	  
10	  (Marshall	  2012)	  
	  
11	  (Cingranelli	  2008)	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uses	  “systematic	  qualitative	  information…meaning	  standardized	  information	  about	  the	  
same	  rights	  for	  each	  country,	  annually”	  to	  construct	  its	  indices	  of	  women’s	  rights	  
(Cingranelli	  2010,	  406).	  CIRI’s	  indicators	  are	  ordinal,	  meaning	  they	  give	  us	  information	  
about	  women’s	  rights	  in	  terms	  of	  “more	  or	  less”	  but	  not	  exactly	  how	  much	  more	  or	  less	  
(Cingranelli	  2010,	  406).	  Their	  justification	  is	  that	  using	  ordinal	  measurement	  
“complement(s)	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  source	  [of	  their]	  information”	  (Cingranelli	  2010,	  406).	  	  
Table	  1:	  Women’s	  Rights	  	  
Political	  Rights	   Economic	  Rights	   Social	  Rights	  
Voting	   Equal	  pay	  for	  equal	  work	   Equal	  inheritance	  
Running	  for	  political	  office	   Free	  choice	  of	  profession	  or	  work	  without	  
the	  need	  to	  obtain	  a	  husband	  or	  male	  
relative’s	  consent	  
Entering	  marriage	  on	  a	  basis	  of	  equality	  
with	  men	  
Holding	  elected	  and	  appointed	  
government	  positions	  
Gainful	  employment	  without	  the	  need	  to	  
obtain	  a	  husband	  or	  male	  relative’s	  
consent	   Traveling	  abroad	  
Joining	  political	  parties	   Equality	  in	  hiring	  and	  promotion	  practices	   Obtaining	  a	  passport	  
Petitioning	  government	  officials	   Job	  security	  (maternity	  leave,	  
unemployment	  benefits,	  no	  arbitrary	  
firing	  or	  layoffs,	  etc.)	  
Conferring	  citizenship	  to	  children	  or	  
husband	  	   Freedom	  from	  sexual	  harassment	  in	  the	  
workplace	  
Initiating	  a	  divorce	  	   Working	  at	  night	   Owning,	  acquiring,	  managing,	  and	  
retaining	  property	  brought	  into	  marriage	  	   Working	  in	  occupations	  classified	  as	  
dangerous	  
Participating	  in	  social,	  cultural,	  and	  
community	  activities	  	   Working	  in	  the	  military	  and/or	  police	  
force	  
Obtaining	  an	  education	  	   	   Freedom	  to	  choose	  a	  residence	  or	  
domicile	  	   	   Freedom	  from	  female	  genital	  mutilation	  
of	  children	  and	  of	  adults	  without	  their	  
consent	  	   	   Freedom	  from	  forced	  sterilization	  
	  
	  “Total	  rights”	  is	  a	  combined	  measure	  of	  women’s	  economic,	  social,	  and	  political	  
rights.	  A	  state	  can	  score	  from	  a	  0,	  which	  indicates	  that	  there	  are	  no	  economic,	  social,	  
and	  political	  rights	  for	  women	  in	  their	  laws	  and	  that	  systematic	  discrimination	  may	  have	  
been	  built	  into	  their	  laws,	  to	  a	  9,	  which	  means	  that	  all	  or	  nearly	  all	  of	  the	  rights	  listed	  
under	  women’s	  political,	  social,	  and	  economic	  rights	  are	  guaranteed	  by	  law	  and	  the	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government	  in	  that	  state	  fully	  and	  vigorously	  enforces	  all	  these	  laws	  in	  practice.	  In	  the	  
second,	  third,	  and	  fourth	  models,	  representing	  women’s	  political,	  economic,	  or	  social	  
rights	  respectively,	  a	  state	  can	  score	  from	  a	  0	  to	  a	  3.	  	  
The	  explanatory	  variable	  of	  interest	  is	  membership	  in	  the	  GATT/WTO.	  This	  is	  a	  
binary	  variable:	  a	  state	  is	  coded	  as	  a	  0	  before	  they	  are	  a	  member	  and	  a	  1	  in	  the	  year	  
they	  join	  and	  thereafter.	  The	  data	  ranges	  from	  1981	  to	  2010;	  this	  is	  mainly	  due	  to	  the	  
women’s	  rights	  data	  available	  from	  the	  CIRI	  Human	  Rights	  Data	  Project.	  The	  control	  
variables	  are	  a	  state’s	  regime	  type	  and	  its	  GDP	  per	  capita.	  The	  data	  for	  regime	  types	  
comes	  from	  the	  Polity	  IV	  Project.	  A	  state	  can	  score	  between	  a	  -­‐10	  and	  a	  +10;	  a	  score	  of	  	  
-­‐10	  denotes	  that	  a	  state	  is	  the	  most	  autocratic,	  according	  to	  the	  Polity	  IV	  metrics;	  a	  
score	  of	  +10	  means	  a	  state	  is	  the	  most	  democratic.	  The	  data	  for	  GDP	  per	  capita	  comes	  
from	  the	  World	  Bank’s	  World	  Development	  Indicators.	  GDP	  per	  capita	  is	  measured	  in	  
current	  US	  dollars.	  The	  models	  also	  include	  a	  lagged	  dependent	  variable	  as	  one	  of	  the	  
explanatory	  variables.	  The	  purpose	  is	  to	  address	  the	  issue	  of	  temporal	  
interdependencies,	  or	  that	  errors	  can	  be	  serially	  correlated.	  	  
	   These	  control	  variables	  (and	  the	  lack	  of	  others)	  were	  chosen	  for	  several	  reasons.	  
First,	  as	  before,	  country	  and	  year	  fixed	  effects	  control	  for	  variation	  across	  countries	  and	  
over	  time	  by	  allowing	  each	  country	  to	  have	  a	  separate	  intercept,	  so	  there	  was	  no	  need	  
to	  include	  a	  control	  for	  regional	  effects,	  which	  I	  initially	  considered.	  Second,	  I	  did	  not	  
control	  for	  levels	  of	  trade	  in	  a	  state,	  because	  I	  believe,	  given	  the	  scholarly	  evidence,	  that	  
membership	  in	  the	  GATT/WTO,	  my	  independent	  variable	  of	  interest,	  causes	  (on	  the	  
aggregate)	  increased	  trade	  in	  all	  states.	  Next,	  after	  reading	  the	  relevant	  literature,	  I	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chose	  GDP	  per	  capita	  and	  a	  state’s	  regime	  type	  as	  the	  most	  widely	  used	  and	  most	  
important	  variables	  to	  control	  for.	  These	  two	  things	  vary	  widely	  across	  states	  and	  can	  
possibly	  have	  effects	  on	  women’s	  rights	  as	  well,	  but	  in	  this	  case	  we	  are	  isolating	  
membership	  in	  the	  GATT/WTO.	  Finally,	  I	  initially	  thought	  to	  include	  some	  other	  control	  
variables:	  women’s	  wages	  (relative	  to	  men),	  a	  country’s	  level	  of	  national	  debt,	  the	  
sectoral	  makeup	  of	  a	  state,	  fertility	  rates,	  etc.	  In	  each	  case,	  I	  ruled	  out	  these	  variables	  
either	  because	  they	  were	  already	  included	  in	  the	  indicators	  in	  my	  dependent	  variable,	  
there	  was	  too	  much	  missing	  data	  that	  caused	  the	  original	  models	  to	  be	  very	  difficult	  to	  
work	  with,	  or	  simply	  because,	  upon	  further	  research,	  did	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  importantly	  
related	  to	  the	  relationship	  in	  question.	  
	   In	  social	  science	  research,	  when	  measuring	  nebulous	  concepts	  such	  as	  women’s	  
rights,	  validity	  is	  important.	  A	  measure	  should	  measure	  the	  concept	  it	  claims	  to	  measure	  
(Cingranelli	  2010,	  418).	  Women’s	  rights	  is	  a	  somewhat	  abstract	  concept;	  abstract	  
concepts	  generate	  controversy	  over	  measurement.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  provide	  a	  clear	  
definition	  of	  the	  concept(s)	  being	  measured:	  Women’s	  (human)	  rights,	  as	  
conceptualized	  and	  measured	  in	  this	  paper,	  refer	  to	  the	  “actions	  of	  government	  officials	  
and	  [the]	  actions	  of	  private	  groups	  if	  instigated	  by	  the	  government	  directly	  affecting	  the	  
degree	  to	  which	  citizens	  (women)	  can	  exercise	  various	  types	  of	  human	  (women’s)	  
rights”	  (Cingranelli	  2010,	  411).	  
The	  CIRI	  Human	  Rights	  Project’s	  women’s	  rights	  indicators	  are	  both	  conceptually	  
and	  empirically	  the	  best	  choice	  for	  measuring	  women’s	  rights.	  They	  measure	  what	  they	  
claim	  to	  measure:	  whether	  (a	  wide	  and	  important	  range	  of)	  women’s	  rights	  are	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protected	  in	  the	  law	  (in	  a	  state)	  and	  enforced	  in	  practice.	  A	  few	  points	  of	  comparison	  
are	  helpful	  in	  demonstrating	  why	  this	  index	  is	  the	  best	  choice.	  The	  Organization	  for	  
Economic	  Cooperation	  and	  Development’s	  Gender,	  Institutions,	  and	  Development	  Data	  
Base	  leaves	  out	  any	  measure	  of	  women’s	  economic	  rights	  as	  part	  of	  their	  input	  
variables.	  The	  Women’s	  Economic	  Opportunity	  Index	  leaves	  out	  political	  rights.	  The	  
most	  widely	  used	  index,	  the	  United	  Nations	  Development	  Program’s	  Gender	  Inequality	  
Index,	  uses	  three	  indicators	  to	  measure	  women’s	  rights:	  a	  health	  dimension,	  which	  
includes	  maternal	  mortality	  and	  adolescent	  fertility	  rates,	  an	  empowerment	  dimension,	  
including	  female	  education	  levels	  and	  number	  of	  seats	  in	  parliament	  held	  by	  women,	  
and	  a	  labor	  dimension,	  which	  measures	  women’s	  participation	  in	  the	  workforce.	  These	  
indicators	  are	  all	  essential	  to	  understand	  the	  level	  of	  women’s	  rights	  in	  a	  state,	  but	  they	  
are	  only	  five	  of	  several	  essential	  indicators.	  In	  addition,	  there	  is	  no	  mention	  of	  the	  
different	  between	  how	  these	  rights	  exist	  in	  law	  versus	  in	  practice.	  Finally,	  the	  timespan	  
for	  this	  database	  is	  very	  short:	  twenty	  years,	  with	  a	  lot	  of	  missing	  data	  for	  many	  states.	  	  
Results	  	  
Model	  number	  one	  (see	  table	  2)	  is	  a	  test	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  membership	  on	  the	  
composite	  measure	  created	  to	  combine	  women’s	  political,	  economic	  and	  social	  rights.	  
This	  measure	  includes	  twenty-­‐six	  different	  metrics	  by	  which	  the	  conditions	  of	  women’s	  
rights	  in	  a	  state	  are	  judged.	  Overall,	  the	  results	  of	  this	  model	  suggest	  that	  there	  is	  not	  a	  
significant	  or	  meaningful	  effect.	  Membership	  in	  the	  GATT/WTO	  is	  associated	  with	  a	  very	  
small	  increase	  in	  women’s	  total	  rights,	  but	  the	  effect	  is	  not	  statistically	  significant.	  What	  
is	  significant	  in	  this	  model	  is	  a	  state’s	  GDP	  per	  capita:	  a	  very	  small	  increase	  in	  GDP	  per	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capita	  is	  correlated	  with	  a	  very	  small	  but	  significant	  increase	  in	  total	  rights.	  Finally,	  a	  
state’s	  polity	  score	  does	  not	  have	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  women’s	  total	  rights	  and	  the	  
while	  the	  coefficient	  is	  positive,	  it	  is	  very	  small	  and	  logically	  does	  not	  indicate	  that	  there	  
is	  a	  meaningful	  relationship	  between	  regime	  type	  and	  level	  of	  total	  rights.	  
Table	  2:	  Four	  Models	  of	  the	  Effect	  of	  Membership	  in	  the	  WTO	  on	  Women’s	  Rights	  	   (1)	  Total	  Rights	   (2)	  Political	  Rights	   (3)	  Economic	  Rights	   (4)	  Social	  Rights	  
l.rights	   .5525*	  
(.0163)	  
.6285*	  
(.0126)	   .4266*	  (.0151)	   .4757*	  (.0177)	  
GATTWTO	   .0911	  
(.0602)	   -­‐.0086	  (.0214)	   .0094	  (.0288)	   .0767*	  (.0331)	  
GDPPC	   .00001*	  
(4.52e-­‐06)	   -­‐1.11e-­‐06	  (9.89e-­‐07)	   9.02e-­‐06*	  (1.33e-­‐06)	   6.90e-­‐06*	  (2.50e-­‐06)	  
Polity2	   .0001	  
(.0044)	   .0016	  (.0016)	   -­‐.0034	  (.0022)	   -­‐.0018	  (.0024)	  
Constant	   1.6706	   .5894	   .6158	   .5256	  
Observations	   2800	   3907	   3846	   2859	  
R-­‐Squared	   .8561	   .7683	   .6561	   .7918	  
*Significant	  at	  the	  95%	  level	  of	  confidence	  
Model	  number	  two	  addresses	  the	  relationship	  between	  membership	  and	  
women’s	  political	  rights.	  Examples	  of	  political	  rights	  measured	  here	  are	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  
and	  the	  right	  to	  hold	  elected	  and	  appointed	  government	  positions.	  	  As	  in	  the	  first	  model,	  
membership	  does	  not	  have	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  women’s	  political	  rights.	  Specifically,	  
membership	  in	  the	  GATT/WTO	  is	  associated	  with	  a	  very	  small	  decrease	  in	  women’s	  
political	  rights,	  however	  the	  effect	  is	  not	  statistically	  significant.	  A	  state’s	  GDP	  per	  capita	  
does	  not	  have	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  political	  rights,	  nor	  does	  a	  state’s	  polity	  score.	  
Overall,	  this	  model	  tells	  us	  that	  effects	  on	  women’s	  political	  rights	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  
affected	  by	  membership	  in	  the	  GATT/WTO.	  
Model	  number	  three	  analyzes	  the	  specific	  relationship	  between	  membership	  
and	  women’s	  economic	  rights.	  There	  are	  several	  types	  of	  [economic]	  rights	  by	  which	  the	  
condition	  of	  overall	  economic	  rights	  state	  is	  judged;	  examples	  include	  equal	  pay	  for	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equal	  work	  and	  equality	  in	  hiring	  and	  promotion	  practices.	  Again	  we	  find	  that,	  according	  
to	  the	  specifications	  of	  this	  model,	  there	  is	  not	  a	  significant	  relationship	  between	  
membership	  and	  economic	  rights.	  While	  the	  effect	  of	  membership	  on	  women’s	  
economic	  rights	  is	  a	  positive	  one,	  it	  is	  very	  small	  and	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  statistical	  
significance,	  is	  likely	  almost	  meaningless.	  There	  is	  a	  significant	  effect	  with	  regard	  to	  a	  
state’s	  GDP	  per	  capita;	  though	  the	  coefficient	  is	  very	  small,	  an	  increase	  in	  GDP	  per	  
capita	  is	  significantly	  associated	  with	  an	  increase	  in	  economic	  rights.	  A	  state’s	  polity	  
score	  does	  not	  have	  a	  statistically	  significant	  effect	  on	  economic	  rights.	  
The	  last	  model,	  model	  number	  four,	  is	  a	  test	  of	  how	  membership	  affects	  
women’s	  social	  rights.	  Social	  rights	  has	  the	  most	  metrics	  that	  make	  up	  the	  standards	  
upon	  which	  a	  state’s	  rights	  score	  is	  decided,	  and	  it	  includes	  rights	  like	  obtaining	  an	  
education	  and	  the	  right	  to	  keep	  property	  brought	  into	  a	  marriage.	  Here,	  membership	  is	  
significant.	  While	  the	  effect	  is	  a	  very	  small	  one,	  membership	  in	  the	  GATT/WTO	  is	  
significant	  associated	  with	  women’s	  social	  rights.	  A	  state’s	  GDP	  per	  capita	  is	  also	  
significant	  in	  this	  model.	  Again,	  the	  coefficient	  is	  small,	  but	  an	  increase	  in	  GDP	  per	  capita	  
is	  significantly	  related	  to	  social	  rights.	  There	  is	  no	  significant	  effect	  of	  a	  state’s	  regime	  
type,	  or	  polity	  score,	  on	  social	  rights.	  
These	  four	  models	  use	  regular	  OLS	  standard	  errors.	  I	  considered	  two	  types	  of	  
tests	  for	  robustness	  (of	  the	  models);	  or	  rather,	  using	  two	  alternate	  types	  of	  standard	  
errors.	  	  The	  first	  was	  panel	  corrected	  standard	  errors;	  the	  second,	  clustered	  standard	  
errors.	  One	  of	  the	  issues	  panel	  corrected	  standard	  errors	  address	  is	  the	  problem	  of	  
contemporaneous	  correlation;	  the	  other,	  panel	  heteroskedasticity.	  These	  issues	  are	  not	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likely	  a	  problem	  here.	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  the	  purpose	  of	  using	  fixed	  effects	  models	  is	  
to,	  as	  accurately	  and	  fully	  as	  possible,	  deal	  with	  year-­‐to-­‐year	  variations	  in	  outcomes.	  In	  
using	  fixed	  effects	  models,	  the	  error	  terms	  should	  not	  be	  contemporaneously	  
correlated,	  nor	  should	  panel	  heteroskedasticity	  be	  an	  issue.	  Clustered	  standard	  errors	  	  
address	  the	  issue	  of	  non-­‐independence	  of	  error	  terms.	  Table	  3	  shows	  the	  results	  of	  
Table	  3:	  Four	  Models	  with	  CSEs	  
*Significant	  at	  the	  95%	  level	  of	  confidence	  
running	  models	  using	  clustered	  standard	  errors	  instead	  of	  regular	  standard	  errors.	  
Comparing	  this	  to	  the	  results	  in	  table	  two,	  there	  are	  two	  things	  to	  note.	  One,	  the	  
statistical	  significance	  does	  not	  change	  for	  any	  of	  the	  constants.	  Two,	  there	  is	  little	  to	  no	  
difference	  in	  the	  error	  terms.	  What	  this	  tells	  us	  is	  not	  that	  non-­‐independence	  is	  not	  a	  
problem,	  but	  rather	  that	  allowing	  the	  error	  structure	  to	  account	  for	  this	  type	  of	  violation	  
of	  independence	  does	  not	  alter	  the	  original	  findings.	  This	  is	  an	  important	  thing	  to	  know	  
when	  checking	  for	  robustness.	  	  
Analysis	  	  	   The	  overall	  conclusion	  here	  is,	  according	  to	  the	  specifications	  of	  these	  models,	  
there	  is	  not	  a	  significant	  effect	  of	  membership	  in	  the	  GATT/WTO	  on	  women’s	  rights.	  
While	  in	  three	  of	  the	  four	  models	  the	  coefficient	  of	  membership	  is	  positive,	  the	  lack	  of	  
statistical	  significance	  is	  more	  important.	  Therefore,	  it	  seems	  that	  membership	  and	  
	   (1)	  Total	  Rights	   (2)	  Political	  Rights	   (3)	  Economic	  Rights	   (4)	  Social	  Rights	  
l.rights	   .5525*	  
(.0163)	  
.6285*	  
(.0126)	   .4266*	  (.0151)	   .4757*	  (.0177)	  
GATTWTO	   .0911	  
(.0602)	   -­‐.0086	  (.0214)	   .0094	  (.0288)	   .0767*	  (.0331)	  
GDPPC	   .00001*	  
(4.52e-­‐06)	   -­‐1.11e-­‐06	  (9.89e-­‐07)	   9.02e-­‐06*	  (1.33e-­‐06)	   6.90e-­‐06*	  (2.50e-­‐06)	  
Polity2	   .0001	  
(.0044)	   .0016	  (.0016)	   -­‐.0034	  (.0022)	   -­‐.0018	  (.0024)	  
Constant	   1.6706	   .5894	   .6158	   .5256	  
Observations	   2800	   3907	   3846	   2859	  
R-­‐Squared	   .8561	   .7683	   .6561	   .7918	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women’s	  rights	  do	  not	  have	  a	  significant	  relationship.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  there	  is	  no	  
effect,	  but	  rather	  that	  the	  overall	  effect	  tested	  here	  is	  not	  statistically	  significant.	  
	   A	  notable	  exception	  is	  women’s	  social	  rights.	  Although	  the	  coefficient	  for	  
membership	  in	  this	  model	  was	  very	  small,	  this	  does	  not	  diminish	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  was	  
statistically	  significant,	  suggesting	  that	  there	  exists	  a	  relationship	  here.	  A	  preliminary	  
hypothesis	  about	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  was	  the	  only	  model	  in	  which	  membership	  was	  
significant	  goes	  something	  like	  this:	  membership	  in	  the	  GATT/WTO	  means	  increased	  
aggregate	  levels	  of	  trade	  in	  a	  state.	  The	  first	  effect	  more	  trade	  seems	  to	  have	  is	  
economic:	  more	  jobs,	  higher	  wages,	  and	  many	  women	  being	  employed	  for	  the	  first	  
time.	  The	  trade	  flows	  model	  speaks	  to	  very	  mixed	  outcomes	  for	  women,	  specifically	  
with	  regard	  to	  those	  things	  that	  affect	  their	  economic	  rights.	  Throughout	  this	  paper,	  I	  
have	  discussed	  how	  a	  woman	  being	  employed	  (and	  some	  women	  being	  employed	  for	  
the	  first	  time)	  and	  having	  one’s	  own	  source	  of	  income	  leads	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  other	  
types	  of	  rights.	  These	  rights	  are	  primarily	  social	  rights:	  being	  able	  to	  afford	  education	  for	  
themselves	  or	  their	  children,	  more	  autonomy	  at	  home,	  including	  for	  example,	  being	  
able	  to	  obtain	  a	  divorce	  if	  need	  be,	  and	  the	  new	  ability	  to	  participate	  in	  activities	  outside	  
the	  home,	  both	  social	  activities	  and	  those	  that	  allow	  them	  to	  play	  a	  larger	  role	  in	  their	  
communities.	  In	  sum,	  while	  any	  changes	  in	  economic	  rights	  seemingly	  are	  a	  mixed	  bag,	  
they	  bring	  about	  secondary	  changes	  in	  social	  rights,	  which	  is	  a	  plausible	  explanation	  as	  
to	  why	  membership	  is	  significant	  in	  this	  model.	  
	   In	  the	  theory	  section,	  I	  discussed	  some	  questions	  and	  plausible	  hypotheses	  each	  
of	  the	  three	  theories	  should	  help	  us	  to	  answer	  after	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  results	  of	  each	  of	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the	  four	  models.	  The	  first	  theory	  (the	  welfare	  state	  theory)	  utilizes	  mechanisms	  that	  
consist	  of	  welfare	  state	  policies,	  and	  their	  subsequent	  effects,	  to	  analyze	  how	  women	  
are	  differentially	  affected.	  I	  posited	  that	  when	  a	  state	  is	  a	  member	  of	  the	  GATT/WTO	  
and	  has	  therefore	  responded	  to	  increased	  vulnerabilities	  by	  using	  welfare	  state	  
mechanisms	  like	  the	  provision	  of	  social	  and	  economic	  insurance	  to	  its	  citizens,	  there	  
could	  be	  one	  of	  three	  effects	  on	  women’s	  rights:	  positive,	  negative,	  or	  mixed.	  The	  
results	  tell	  us	  that	  membership	  is	  only	  significant	  in	  the	  case	  of	  women’s	  social	  rights.	  In	  
the	  CIRI	  women’s	  rights	  data	  set,	  social	  and	  economic	  insurance	  policies	  fall	  under	  one	  
of	  the	  metrics	  used	  to	  measure	  levels	  of	  economic	  rights,	  “job	  security:	  maternity	  leave,	  
unemployment	  benefits,	  no	  arbitrary	  firing	  or	  layoffs,	  etc.”	  (Cingranelli	  2008).	  While	  
membership	  does	  have	  a	  positive	  effect	  on	  women’s	  economic	  rights,	  the	  effect	  is	  very	  
small	  and	  statistically	  insignificant.	  However,	  the	  provision	  of	  social	  and	  economic	  
insurance	  to	  women	  very	  likely	  has	  some	  significant	  effects	  on	  other	  types	  of	  rights	  that	  
fall	  in	  all	  three	  of	  the	  categories	  measured	  in	  these	  models.	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  the	  
logical	  conclusion	  to	  draw	  from	  the	  results	  of	  the	  models,	  the	  specifications	  of	  the	  
welfare	  state	  theory,	  and	  thinking	  about	  the	  results	  of	  the	  testable	  hypotheses,	  is	  that	  
the	  outcomes	  for	  women	  are	  mixed.	  	  
	   The	  mechanisms	  subsumed	  under	  the	  international	  effects	  theory	  are	  how	  
membership	  changes	  the	  behavior	  of	  states:	  how	  being	  a	  member	  of	  an	  international	  
trade	  institution	  or	  related	  international	  trade	  agreement	  changes	  a	  state’s	  domestic	  
politics	  and	  policies,	  which	  then	  affects	  women’s	  rights.	  I	  posited	  that	  a	  state	  could	  
either	  be	  constrained	  in	  its	  ability	  to	  change	  policies	  that	  affect	  women,	  or	  could	  be	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forced	  to	  as	  a	  condition	  of	  membership.	  The	  outcomes	  for	  women	  could	  be	  negative,	  
positive,	  or	  mixed.	  The	  mechanisms	  subsumed	  under	  this	  theory	  can	  best	  be	  used	  to	  
predict	  outcomes	  for	  the	  types	  of	  political	  and	  economic	  rights	  found	  in	  the	  CIRI	  data	  
set;	  they	  could	  arguably	  be	  logically	  extended	  in	  thinking	  about	  effects	  on	  women’s	  
social	  rights	  as	  well.	  Here	  again,	  the	  conclusion	  is	  that	  outcomes	  are	  mixed.	  While	  
membership	  does	  not	  have	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  women’s	  total,	  political,	  or	  economic	  
rights,	  it	  does	  on	  women’s	  social	  rights.	  It	  is	  more	  than	  likely	  that	  member	  states	  are	  
both	  forced	  and	  constrained	  with	  regard	  to	  policy	  change,	  and	  this	  has	  differential	  
effects	  on	  different	  types	  of	  rights.	  
	   The	  trade	  flows	  theory	  outlines	  how	  mechanisms	  such	  as	  aggregate	  economic	  
growth	  (or	  lack	  thereof)	  and	  subsequent	  job	  growth	  results	  in	  new	  or	  changed	  job	  
opportunities	  for	  women.	  I	  hypothesized	  that	  these	  new	  or	  changed	  opportunities	  could	  
have	  a	  negative	  or	  positive	  effect	  for	  women’s	  rights,	  or	  altogether	  mixed	  outcomes.	  
The	  mechanisms	  in	  this	  theory	  explain	  first	  on	  how	  gaining	  the	  opportunity	  to	  work	  for	  
the	  first	  time	  or	  losing	  one’s	  job	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  expansion	  of	  trade	  and	  the	  resultant	  
growth.	  Then,	  they	  help	  us	  analyze	  how	  women’s	  economic	  rights	  are	  affected	  by	  their	  
employment	  status.	  Finally,	  they	  can	  be	  used	  to	  think	  about	  outcomes	  for	  social	  or	  
political	  rights.	  The	  data	  tells	  us	  that	  membership	  does	  not	  have	  a	  statistically	  significant	  
effect	  on	  economic	  rights	  or	  political	  rights.	  While	  new	  or	  changed	  job	  opportunities	  
may	  be	  a	  mixed	  bag	  for	  women	  in	  terms	  of	  economic	  outcomes	  (for	  them)	  and	  thus	  
there	  is	  nothing	  these	  models	  can	  tell	  us,	  it	  is	  again	  plausible	  that	  economic	  opportunity	  
(or	  lack	  thereof)	  spills	  over	  into	  other	  types	  of	  opportunities	  for	  women,	  such	  as	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autonomy,	  education,	  retaining	  property,	  participating	  in	  the	  community,	  having	  the	  
ability	  to	  travel	  (see	  table	  one),	  etc.	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CHAPTER	  IV	  
	  CONCLUSIONS	  
	   The	  theories	  tested	  in	  this	  paper	  outlined	  a	  set	  of	  strongly	  positive	  and	  a	  set	  of	  
strongly	  negative	  outcomes	  for	  women.	  In	  each	  of	  the	  four	  models,	  the	  results	  say	  
otherwise.	  Each	  theory	  produced	  a	  set	  of	  testable	  hypotheses	  that	  also	  predicted	  
positive	  or	  negative	  effects	  for	  women’s	  rights.	  Each	  theory	  also	  included	  a	  hypothesis	  
that	  predicted	  mixed	  effects	  for	  women.	  The	  results	  of	  the	  data	  and	  a	  look	  back	  at	  the	  
underlying	  empirical	  support	  for	  each	  theory	  proved	  this	  hypothesis,	  in	  each	  case,	  to	  be	  
the	  most	  accurate	  in	  explaining	  how	  membership	  affects	  women’s	  rights.	  In	  the	  
introductory	  section,	  I	  offered	  a	  brief	  explanation	  for	  how	  to	  reconcile	  the	  
inconsistencies	  between	  my	  theories	  and	  the	  results	  of	  my	  data	  analysis.	  I	  will	  expand	  
upon	  this	  explanation	  in	  this	  section	  and	  then	  offer	  some	  concluding	  remarks.	  
	   In	  the	  real	  world,	  positive	  and	  negative	  effects	  go	  hand	  in	  hand	  for	  women.	  Each	  
of	  the	  three	  theories	  predict	  a	  set	  of	  positive	  effects	  and	  a	  set	  of	  negative	  ones,	  as	  do	  
several	  of	  the	  hypotheses,	  but	  in	  reality	  membership	  in	  the	  GATT/WTO	  and	  the	  
subsequent	  effects	  that	  affect	  women’s	  rights	  are	  often	  a	  mixed	  bag.	  For	  example,	  a	  
state	  provides	  good	  social	  insurance,	  but	  only	  to	  people	  that	  are	  employed	  in	  
traditional,	  full-­‐time	  wage-­‐earning	  positions.	  In	  many	  cases,	  women	  work	  as	  part-­‐time	  
employees,	  domestic	  workers,	  or	  unpaid	  care	  workers	  for	  their	  family	  or	  for	  friends.	  
There	  may	  exist	  a	  minimum	  safety	  net	  for	  these	  types	  of	  employees,	  but	  the	  benefits	  
provided	  are	  not	  nearly	  as	  solid	  or	  comprehensive	  as	  those	  given	  to	  people	  that	  work	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full-­‐time	  in	  a	  “traditional”	  position.	  However,	  some	  benefits	  for	  some	  women	  gives	  
these	  women	  a	  measure	  of	  security	  they	  did	  not	  previous	  have,	  and	  could	  possibly	  be	  a	  
stepping	  stone	  for	  more	  benefits	  for	  more	  women	  in	  the	  future.	  Another	  example	  is	  the	  
effect	  of	  increased	  trade	  giving	  women	  more	  job	  opportunities	  and	  therefore	  a	  chance	  
to	  earn	  income	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  but	  with	  this	  opportunity	  comes	  drawbacks,	  among	  
them	  low	  wages,	  dangerous	  working	  conditions,	  and	  unstable	  terms	  of	  employment.	  
However,	  having	  their	  own	  source	  of	  income,	  what	  the	  sacrifice	  they	  must	  make	  to	  earn	  
this	  income,	  gives	  women	  autonomy,	  status,	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  
community	  and	  even	  possibly	  in	  local	  politics.	  
	   Regardless	  of	  any	  inconsistencies	  between	  predictions	  made	  by	  theory	  and	  the	  
results	  of	  the	  models,	  it	  is	  of	  the	  utmost	  importance	  to	  pay	  attention	  to	  the	  very	  real	  
effects	  of	  membership	  in	  the	  GATT/WTO	  on	  women’s	  rights.	  The	  WTO	  and	  the	  GATT	  
before	  it	  are	  tasked	  with	  making	  trade	  freer	  and	  fairer	  for	  every	  member	  country,	  and	  
to	  continually	  facilitate	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  exchanged	  in	  
the	  international	  economy.	  With	  increased	  international	  exchange	  comes	  increased	  
growth;	  with	  growth	  come	  challenges	  and	  opportunities	  for	  member	  states.	  
	   Membership	  in	  the	  GATT/WTO	  has	  come	  to	  affect	  nearly	  every	  aspect	  of	  a	  
woman’s	  political,	  social,	  and	  economic	  life,	  including	  the	  rights	  and	  opportunities	  
afforded	  to	  her	  and	  those	  from	  which	  she	  is	  denied.	  Women	  are	  afforded	  more	  
opportunities	  to	  work	  and	  earn	  income	  and	  independence,	  but	  along	  with	  this	  come	  the	  
cost	  of	  low	  wages	  and	  poor	  working	  conditions.	  Growth	  in	  exports	  means	  a	  wider	  
breadth	  of	  job	  opportunities,	  but	  many	  women	  also	  lose	  their	  jobs	  when	  the	  industry	  in	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which	  they	  worked	  is	  no	  longer	  competitive	  in	  a	  globalized	  market.	  The	  growth	  of	  
international	  trade	  brings	  along	  with	  it	  the	  spread	  of	  new	  ideas,	  and	  more	  and	  more	  
women	  are	  gaining	  basic	  democratic	  political	  rights,	  but	  many	  countries	  still	  deny	  or	  
harass	  women	  in	  their	  attempt	  to	  vote.	  Openness	  to	  market	  vulnerabilities	  often	  forces	  
a	  state	  to	  expand	  the	  coverage	  of	  its	  welfare	  regime	  and	  its	  mechanisms,	  but	  in	  many	  
cases	  coverage	  options	  and	  benefits	  are	  not	  without	  traditional	  familial	  and	  gender	  
biases.	  
	   In	  the	  pursuit	  of	  growth	  and	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  moral	  and	  economic	  correctness	  
of	  free	  trade	  policies,	  the	  rights	  and	  opportunities	  of	  women	  are	  usually	  overlooked	  or	  
set	  aside.	  This	  paper	  does	  not	  wish	  to	  judge	  the	  merits	  of	  the	  expansion	  of	  free	  trade	  (as	  
a	  consequence	  of	  membership	  in	  the	  GATT/WTO)	  a	  policy	  or	  as	  an	  economic	  practice.	  
However,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  in	  the	  specific	  case	  of	  the	  effects	  on	  women’s	  rights,	  the	  rising	  
tide	  of	  free	  trade	  only	  provides	  life-­‐support	  for	  women,	  but	  certainly	  does	  not	  float	  all	  
boats.	  
	   	  
	   47	  
REFERENCES	  CITED	  
	  
Aaronson,	  S.	  and	  Abouharb,	  M.	  2011.	  "Unexpected	  bedfellows:	  The	  GATT,	  the	  WTO,	  and	  
some	  democratic	  rights."	  International	  Studies	  Quarterly	  no.	  55	  (2):1-­‐30.	  
Aaronson,	  S.	  and	  Zimmerman,	  J.	  2008.	  Trade	  Imbalance:	  The	  Struggle	  to	  Weigh	  Human	  
Rights	  Concerns	  in	  Trade	  Policymaking.	  New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  
Aho,	  C.	  and	  Orr,	  J.	  1981.	  "Trade	  sensitive	  employment:	  Who	  are	  the	  affected	  workers?"	  
Monthly	  Labor	  Review	  no.	  104:29-­‐35.	  
Amao,	  O.	  2009.	  "Trade	  sanctions,	  human	  rights,	  and	  multinational	  corporations:	  The	  EU-­‐
ACP	  context."	  Hastings	  International	  and	  Comparative	  Law	  Review	  no.	  32	  
(2):379-­‐422.	  
Baier,	  S.	  and	  Bergstrand,	  J.	  2007.	  "Do	  free	  trade	  agreements	  actually	  increase	  members'	  
international	  trade?"	  Journal	  of	  international	  Economics	  no.	  71	  (1):72-­‐95.	  
Balciunaite,	  V.	  2008.	  The	  WTO	  and	  female	  labor	  rights	  in	  developing	  countries.	  Brussels:	  
The	  Institue	  for	  European	  Studies.	  
Baldwin,	  R.	  2012.	  "The	  case	  for	  a	  multilateral	  trade	  organization."	  In	  The	  Oxford	  
Handbook	  on	  the	  World	  Trade	  Organization,	  edited	  by	  A.	  Narlikar,	  Daunton,	  M.	  
and	  Stern,	  R.,	  29-­‐39.	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  
Beneria,	  L.	  2003.	  Gender,	  Development,	  and	  Globalization:	  Economics	  As	  If	  All	  People	  
Mattered.	  London:	  Routledge.	  
Bhagwati,	  J.	  1994.	  "Free	  trade:	  Old	  and	  new	  challenges."	  The	  Economic	  Journal	  no.	  104	  
(423):231-­‐246.	  
Brady,	  D.	  et	  al.	  2005.	  "Economic	  globalization	  and	  the	  welfare	  state	  in	  affluent	  
democracies,	  1975-­‐2001."	  American	  Sociological	  Review	  no.	  70	  (6):921-­‐948.	  
Bunch,	  C.	  1990.	  "Women's	  rights	  as	  human	  rights:	  Toward	  a	  re-­‐vision	  of	  human	  rights."	  
Human	  Rights	  Quarterly	  no.	  12	  (4):486-­‐498.	  
	   48	  
Busse,	  M.	  and	  Speilman,	  C.	  2006.	  "Gender	  inequality	  and	  trade."	  Review	  of	  International	  
Economics	  no.	  14	  (3):362-­‐379.	  
Chang,	  P.	  and	  Lee,	  M.	  2011.	  "The	  WTO	  trade	  effect."	  Journal	  of	  International	  Economics	  
no.	  85	  (1):53-­‐71.	  
Cingranelli,	  D.	  and	  Richards,	  D.	  2008.	  CIRI	  Human	  Rights	  Data	  Project.	  
———.	  2010.	  "The	  cingranelli	  and	  richards	  (CIRI)	  human	  rights	  data	  project."	  Human	  
Rights	  Quarterly	  no.	  32	  (2):401-­‐424.	  
Coryndon,	  A.	  and	  Raworth,	  K.	  2004.	  Trading	  Away	  Our	  Rights:	  Women	  Working	  in	  Global	  
Supply	  Chains.	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  
Dollar,	  D.	  and	  Gatti,	  R.	  1999.	  Gender	  inquality,	  income,	  and	  growth:	  Are	  good	  times	  
good	  for	  women?	  :	  The	  World	  Bank	  Development	  Research	  Group.	  
Engle,	  K.	  1991-­‐1992.	  "International	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Feminism:	  When	  Discourses	  
Meet."	  Michigan	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  no.	  13:517-­‐610.	  
Fuentes,	  A.	  and	  Ehrenreich,	  B.	  1984.	  Women	  in	  the	  Global	  Factory.	  Cambridge:	  South	  
End	  Press.	  
Ghosh,	  J.	  1999.	  Impact	  of	  globalization	  on	  women:	  Women	  and	  economic	  liberalization	  
in	  the	  Asian	  and	  Pacific	  Region.	  United	  Nations:	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Commission	  
for	  Asia	  and	  the	  Pacific.	  
Goldstein,	  J.L.,	  D.	  Rivers,	  and	  M.	  Tomz.	  2007.	  "Institutions	  in	  International	  Relations:	  
Understanding	  the	  Effects	  of	  the	  GATT	  and	  the	  WTO	  on	  World	  Trade."	  
International	  Organization	  no.	  61	  (01):37-­‐67.	  
Gough,	  I.	  2001.	  "Globalizationa	  and	  regional	  welfare	  regimes:	  The	  East	  Asian	  case."	  
Global	  Social	  Policy	  no.	  1	  (2):163-­‐189.	  
Gowa,	  J.	  2009.	  Institutions	  and	  outcomes:	  The	  GATT/WTO	  and	  postwar	  trade.	  Princeton	  
University.	  
	   49	  
Gowa,	  J.S.,	  and	  S.Y.	  Kim.	  2006.	  "An	  exclusive	  country	  club:	  The	  effects	  of	  the	  GATT	  on	  
trade,	  1950-­‐94."	  World	  Politics	  no.	  57	  (4):453-­‐478.	  
Grewal,	  I.	  1999.	  "'Women's	  rights	  as	  human	  rights':	  Feminist	  practices,	  global	  feminism,	  
and	  human	  rights	  in	  transnationalist."	  Citizenship	  studies	  no.	  3	  (3):337-­‐354.	  
Grynberg,	  R.	  2006.	  "A	  theory	  of	  trade	  and	  development	  of	  small	  vulnerable	  states."	  In	  
WTO	  at	  the	  Margins:	  Small	  States	  and	  the	  Multilateral	  Trading	  System,	  edited	  by	  
R.	  Grynberg,	  11-­‐28.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  
Hafner-­‐Burton,	  E.	  and	  Montgomery,	  A.	  2008a.	  Globalization	  and	  the	  social	  power	  
politics	  of	  international	  economic	  networks.	  University	  of	  California,	  San	  Diego.	  
———.	  2008b.	  "Power	  or	  plenty:	  How	  do	  international	  trade	  institutions	  affect	  
economic	  sanctions?"	  Journal	  of	  Conflict	  Resolution	  no.	  52	  (2):213-­‐242.	  
Hafner-­‐Burton,	  E.	  et	  al.	  2008c.	  "Internationa	  human	  rights	  law	  and	  the	  politics	  of	  
legitimation."	  International	  Sociology	  no.	  23	  (1):115-­‐141.	  
Hiscox,	  M.	  2001.	  "Class	  versus	  industry	  cleavages:	  Inter-­‐industry	  factor	  mobility	  and	  the	  
politics	  of	  trade."	  International	  Organization	  no.	  55	  (1):1-­‐46.	  
Iversen,	  Torben	  and	  Cusack,	  Thomas.	  2000.	  "The	  Causes	  of	  Welfare	  State	  Expansion."	  
World	  Politics	  no.	  52	  (3):313-­‐349.	  
Jarvis,	  L.	  2000/2001.	  "Women's	  rights	  and	  the	  public	  morals	  exception	  of	  GATT	  article	  
20."	  Michigan	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  no.	  22:219-­‐238.	  
Keohane,	  R.O.	  1996.	  Internationalization	  and	  domestic	  politics:	  Cambridge	  Univ	  Pr.	  
Kim,	  S.Y.	  2010.	  Power	  and	  the	  Governance	  of	  Global	  Trade:	  From	  the	  GATT	  to	  the	  WTO:	  
Cornell	  Univ	  Pr.	  
Korinek,	  J.	  2005.	  Trade	  and	  gender:	  Issues	  and	  interactions.	  OECD	  Trade	  Directorate.	  
	   50	  
Krugman,	  P.	  1987.	  "Is	  free	  trade	  passe?"	  The	  Journal	  of	  Economic	  Perspectives	  no.	  1	  
(2):131-­‐144.	  
Lamy,	  P.	  2008.	  "The	  WTO's	  contribution	  to	  global	  governance."	  In	  The	  WTO	  and	  Global	  
Governance:	  Future	  Directions,	  edited	  by	  G.	  Sampson,	  39-­‐56.	  Hong	  Kong:	  United	  
Nations	  University.	  
Mahler,	  V.	  2004.	  "Economic	  globalization,	  domestic	  politics,	  and	  income	  inequality	  in	  
the	  developed	  countries:	  A	  cross-­‐national	  study."	  Comparative	  Political	  Studies	  
no.	  37	  (9):1025-­‐1053.	  
Marshall,	  M.	  and	  Gurr,	  T.	  2012.	  Polity	  IV	  Project:	  Political	  Regime	  Characteristics	  and	  
Transitions,	  1800-­‐2012.	  edited	  by	  Societal-­‐Systems	  Research.	  University	  of	  
Maryland.	  
Mengesha,	  E.	  2006.	  Making	  the	  international	  trade	  regime	  work	  for	  gender	  equality.	  
The	  World	  Bank.	  
Milner,	  H.,	  and	  Kubota,	  K.	  2005.	  "Why	  the	  Move	  to	  Free	  Trade?	  Democracy	  and	  Trade	  
Policy	  in	  the	  Developing	  Countries."	  International	  Organization	  no.	  59	  (1):107-­‐
143.	  
Neuhold,	  B.	  2005.	  Focus	  on	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Gender	  Justice.	  Vienna.	  
Ostry,	  S.	  2008.	  "The	  WTO,	  global	  governance,	  and	  policy	  options."	  In	  The	  WTO	  and	  
Global	  Governance:	  Future	  Directions,	  edited	  by	  G.	  Sampson,	  57-­‐77.	  Hong	  Kong:	  
United	  Nations	  University.	  
Paul,	  J.	  2003/2004.	  "Do	  international	  trade	  institutions	  contribute	  to	  economic	  growth	  
and	  development?"	  Virginia	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  no.	  44	  (1):286-­‐340.	  
Randriamo,	  Z.	  2006.	  Gender	  and	  Trade:	  Overview	  Report.	  In	  BRIDGE.	  United	  Kingdrom:	  
Institute	  of	  Development	  Studies.	  
Redding,	  S.	  1999.	  "Dynamic	  comparative	  advantage	  and	  the	  welfare	  effects	  of	  trade."	  
Oxford	  Economic	  Papers	  no.	  51	  (1):15-­‐39.	  
	   51	  
Rodrik,	  D.	  1998.	  "Why	  Do	  More	  Open	  Economies	  Have	  Bigger	  Governments?"	  Journal	  of	  
Political	  Economy	  no.	  106	  (5):997-­‐1032.	  
Rose,	  A.	  2002.	  Do	  we	  really	  know	  that	  the	  WTO	  increases	  trade?	  National	  Bureau	  of	  
Economic	  Research.	  
Rose,	  A.K.	  2004.	  "Do	  WTO	  members	  have	  more	  liberal	  trade	  policy?"	  Journal	  of	  
International	  Economics	  no.	  63	  (2):209-­‐235.	  
Rudra,	  Nita.	  2002.	  "Globalization	  and	  the	  decline	  of	  the	  welfare	  state	  in	  less-­‐developed	  
countries."	  International	  Organization	  no.	  56	  (2):411-­‐45.	  
Runyan,	  A.	  2003.	  "The	  places	  of	  women	  in	  trading	  places	  revisited:	  Gendered	  
global/regional	  regimes	  and	  inter-­‐nationalized	  feminist	  resistance."	  In	  
Globalization:	  Theory	  and	  Practice,	  edited	  by	  E.	  and	  Runyan	  Kofman,	  A.,	  139-­‐156.	  
New	  York:	  Continuum.	  
Sainsbury,	  D.	  1999.	  Gender	  and	  Welfare	  State	  Regimes.	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  
Press.	  
Seguino,	  S.	  2000.	  "Gender	  inequality	  and	  economic	  growth:	  A	  cross-­‐country	  analysis."	  
World	  Development	  no.	  28	  (7):1211-­‐1230.	  
Simmons,	  Beth	  A.	  and	  Elkins,	  Zachary.	  2004.	  "The	  Globalization	  of	  Liberalization:	  Policy	  
Diffusion	  in	  the	  International	  Political	  Economy."	  American	  Political	  Science	  
Review	  no.	  98	  (1):171-­‐189.	  
Standig,	  G.	  1999.	  "Global	  feminization	  through	  flexible	  labor:	  A	  theme	  revisited."	  World	  
Development	  no.	  27	  (3):583-­‐602.	  
Subramanian,	  A.	  and	  Wei,	  S.	  2007.	  "The	  WTO	  promotes	  trade,	  strongly	  but	  unevenly."	  
Journal	  of	  International	  Economics	  no.	  72	  (1):151-­‐175.	  
Tellez,	  E.	  et	  al.	  2010.	  Did	  trade	  liberalization	  help	  women?	  The	  case	  of	  Mexico	  in	  the	  
1990s.	  Cambridge:	  National	  Bureau	  of	  Economic	  Research.	  
	   52	  
Tran-­‐Nguyen,	  A.	  and	  Zampetti,	  A.	  2004.	  Trade	  and	  Gender:	  Opportunities	  and	  Challenges	  
for	  Developing	  Countries.	  New	  York:	  United	  Nations.	  
van	  Staveren,	  I.	  .	  2002.	  Toward	  monitoring	  mutual	  trade-­‐gender	  links.	  The	  Netherlands:	  
Institute	  of	  Social	  Studies.	  
Wee,	  V.	  1998.	  Trade	  Liberalisation:	  Challenges	  and	  Opportunities	  for	  Women	  in	  
Southeast	  Asia	  and	  Beyond.	  New	  York:	  Unifem.	  
Williams,	  M.	  2002.	  Gender	  and	  governance	  in	  the	  multilateral	  trading	  system:	  Critical	  
areas	  of	  decision-­‐making	  and	  global	  responses.	  
World	  Development	  Indicators.	  2013.	  edited	  by	  The	  World	  Bank	  Group.	  Washington,	  
D.C.	  
	  
	  
